The Paradox of Kishida Fumio: The Prime Minister Who Needed a Director

Kishida in the Rearview Mirror

On August 14, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced his intent to step down from Japan’s top office, taking responsibility for the political finance scandal that has rocked the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. With an LDP leadership election scheduled for September, Kishida decided not to seek another term as leader of the governing party.

The Kishida cabinet had been under a dark cloud since the previous December, when allegations surfaced that several LDP factions had been funneling undeclared income from fundraising parties into faction members’ slush funds. In January 2024, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office charged three Diet members from the Abe faction and accountants for the Abe, Nikai, and Kishida factions on suspicion of violating the Political Funds Control Act. In response, the prime minister purged his cabinet of Abe faction members, announced the dissolution of his own faction—causing all but one of the other LDP factions to follow suit—and voluntarily testified before a Diet ethics committee. He also pushed through legislation strengthening rules and penalties pertaining to political finance reporting. But the cabinet’s public approval rating continued to plummet, and in the end Kishida had no choice but to step down.

Having taken office on October 4, 2021, Kishida led the Japanese government for nearly three years. By length of tenure, he ranks eighth (right after Kishi Nobusuke) among Japan’s 35 postwar prime ministers. During Kishida’s 1,094 days in office, his government dealt decisively with the COVID-19 crisis while making important progress on diplomacy and security, as well as in the field of domestic policies, such as legislation on economic security promotion, the transformation of nuclear energy policy, expanded child support, the introduction of the Child and Families Agency, and digital transformation.

Nonetheless, in a Nikkei poll conducted on August 23, nine days after Kishida announced his decision, only 48% of respondents assessed his achievements as prime minister positively. In a similar poll conducted when Prime Minister Abe Shinzō stepped down, a full 74% gave Abe’s record a positive rating (August 31, 2020). The following year, 57% gave the short-lived administration of Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide good grades overall (September 12, 2021).

This raises two questions. One is how Kishida managed to stay in office so long despite his low approval ratings. An even more pressing question is why his achievements in office were so underrated.

In short, it was very difficult for the public to understand his policy formulation. More concretely, there were three reasons the public could not appreciate his policy achievements. First, Kishida’s ministerial appointments failed to effectively communicate the direction of his policies to the public. Second, the paradox of the “strong Kantei” shifted public attention away from the substances of policies and the processes behind them.

Third, the prime minister lacked a close aide who could serve as a “director” to devise strategies for the timing and sequencing of policy implementations in such a way that the public could more easily grasp the administration’s policies and political objectives.

In the following, I explore these two questions—on the length of time Kishida remained in office, and on the lack of recognition for what he did while there—with an emphasis on the latter.

Defying the 30% Rule

In Japan, any prime minister whose cabinet approval rating falls below 30% is widely believed to be at imminent risk. Public support for Prime Minister Kishida’s cabinet dropped into the danger zone in November 2023, according to polling by the Yomiuri Shimbun. Yet it was another nine months before he bowed out. How did he manage to hang on for such a long time? The explanation boils down to three basic factors.

First, while the Kishida administration was beset by a number of scandals, it committed no fatal policy errors. It is true that Kishida’s reputation suffered when he announced a tax cut less than a year later after he urged the need for a tax hike to finance higher defense spending. But this was not a fiasco comparable to the rash promise by Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (in office 2009–10) to relocate US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma outside of Okinawa Prefecture.

Second, the Kishida administration consistently enjoyed a ruling party majority in the Diet, which was necessary to enact legislation—unlike the cabinets of Prime Ministers Fukuda Yasuo and Kan Naoto, which had to grapple with legislative gridlock. The slush-fund scandal, while causing the government’s approval rating to plunge below 30%, temporarily strengthened Kishida’s hand within the LDP, first by neutralizing the numerically dominant Abe faction and then by forcing the disbandment of all the competing factions but one. Even at the height of the scandal, Kishida managed to realize precisely the outcomes he was aiming for with respect to amendment of the Political Funds Control Act, notwithstanding criticism of the rushed legislative process.

The third reason Kishida held on as long as he did was that the LDP had no need to face the judgment of the voters nationwide until October 30, 2025, when the lower house members’ terms were set to expire—well after the LDP leadership election was scheduled to be held. If a general election had been imminent, Kishida probably would have come under strong pressure to step down sooner, since an unpopular prime minister can jeopardize the reelection of other LDP lawmakers. As it was, there was no need to rock the boat by forcing Kishida out ahead of the September 2024 LDP presidential election.

COVID, Diplomacy, and Defense

Let us turn now to the second question: Why did Kishida get so little credit for his achievements while in office? I begin by reviewing his accomplishments objectively.

Kishida’s most urgent challenge on taking office in October 2021 was responding to the COVID-19 crisis. He moved quickly to impose border controls and beef up internal response measures, such as funding for hospital beds. At the same time, he tackled a number of key issues in the realm of foreign and security policy, as well as other domestic policy challenges.

The Kishida cabinet’s most important achievement foreign policy and defense was the design of Japan’s three key security documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Plan. Marking a historic policy shift, the three documents called for the development of counterstrike capabilities and the acquisition of long-range cruise missiles, as well as a substantial expansion in security spending. To finance the expansion of the defense budget, the government planned to impose surtaxes on corporations and income earners.

In foreign policy, Kishida strengthened ties with the United States and improved relations with South Korea. On March 20 last year, he announced Japan’s New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which outlined steps for strengthening ties with India and other countries in the region. The next day Kishida visited war-torn Ukraine. In May, he hosted the Group of Seven Hiroshima Summit, where the G7 leaders agreed to maintain their support for Ukraine and uphold the free and open world order based on the rule of law. On the final day of the summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy arrived in Hiroshima and secured renewed pledges for support from the G7.

New Form of Capitalism

The centerpiece on which Kishida ran for president of the ruling party was his “new form of capitalism.” The basic idea was for the government to intervene more actively in the economy and boost household incomes, leveraging public policy and spending to support investment in human resources, technological innovation, and the development and growth of key industries.

Kishida’s first achievement in this area was the enactment of the Economic Security Promotion Act in May 2022. Along with this policy, the administration successfully negotiated with the semiconductor giant Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company to build a second chip factory in Japan as a step toward rebuilding the nation’s semiconductor industry.

To raise incomes, Kishida prioritized wage increases. In addition to lobbying business groups like Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), the government introduced an expanded tax deduction for companies that raised salaries. Furthermore, it introduced annual increases to the average hourly minimum wage. Moreover, Kishida emphasized increasing income from investment. To this end, the Council on the New Form of Capitalism introduced the Doubling Asset-Based Income Plan in November 2022. As part of this initiative, the government expanded the tax-exempt Nippon Individual Savings Account program and made it permanent, starting in 2024.

In terms of monetary policy, Kishida initially supported the program of quantitative easing and negative interest rates adopted by the Bank of Japan under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. However, as the yen weakened and inflation surged, pressure mounted for a policy shift. When the BOJ announced an end to negative interest rates in March 2024 and started to gradually shift away from quantitative easing, Kishida supported the central bank’s policy.

Family Policy, Nuclear Energy, and Ridesharing

The Kishida administration also designed childcare support policies to address Japan’s population decline. In June 2022, it succeessfully passed legislation to establish the Children and Families Agency. In January 2023, Prime Minister Kishida made a public committment to devising “unprecedented” measures to tackle the demographic crisis. Subsequently, in June the administration adopted the Children’s Future Strategy, a comprehensive plan to combat demographic decline with a series of measures costing a total of ¥3.6 trillion.

Moreoever, the prime minister revised the nation’s energy policy. In August 2022 Kishida announced that Japan would not only restart more of its suspended nuclear plants but also explore options for developing and building a new generation of reactors. The construction of nuclear power plants was incorporated in the Basic Policy for the Realization of GX (green transformation), adopted in February 2023 as a cornerstone of the administration’s energy policy. Furthermore, in August 2023, the Kishida cabinet approved the release of treated wastewater from the disabled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the Pacific Ocean.

Kishida also helped to accelerate digital transformation by ordering a review of close to 10,000 administrative rules and procedures requiring in-person involvement. Kishida also made the decision to legalize ridesharing services in certain areas, beginning in May 2024.

Trust Undermined by Cabinet Appointments

Not all of Kishida’s economic policies bore fruit. For example, despite his emphasis on boosting incomes, real wages continued to decline for 26 consecutive months, from March 2022 until May this year; it was not until June 2024 that wage hikes began to outpace inflation. Still, there is no question that Kishida accomplished a great deal in three years. What, then, accounts for his poor ratings as a prime minister? I suggest that there are three major reasons: ill-considered appointments, the “paradox of the powerful Kantei,” and the lack of a strategist directing the action. Let us look at each of these issues in turn.

The primary reason behind Kishida’s low public support lies in the poor impression created by his ministerial appointments. When forming and reshuffling his cabinets, Kishida placed too much emphasis on factional affiliation and seniority. As a result, there was very little sense that he was choosing the best people to tackle the unprecedented challenges facing the government. Particularly damaging was Kishida’s appointment of “waitlisted” politicians, veteran LDP lawmakers who had been repeatedly passed over for cabinet positions. Several of these ended up being replaced, one due to a major gaffe and others for financial scandals. These personnel failures seriously undermined Kishida’s public image.

Paradox of the Strong Kantei

Another reason Kishida did not get more credit for his accomplishments is that the Kantei—namely, his supporting staff and the Cabinet Secretariat (virtually equivalent to the prime minister’s office)—had become so powerful that the policymaking process proceeded without political friction, and as a result, did not catch much public attention. I call this the “paradox of the powerful Kantei.”

Beginning around the mid-1990s, a variety political and administrative reforms (including changes in the electoral system, streamlining of the administrative organizations, establishment of the National Security Council, and reform of the national civil service system) bolstered the centralized policymaking and coordinating functions of the Kantei and strengthened the prime minister’s power within the ruling party, the cabinet, and the bureaucracy. This made it much easier for prime ministers to pursue their own policy priorities without bending to opposition forces within the LDP or the administration.

Herein lies the paradox. When the prime minister’s policy formulation does meet internal resistance, the resulting friction calls attention to the prime minister’s leadership and to the policies themselves, for better or for worse. Ironically, when the policymaking proceeds smoothly, it attracts less interest. Under Prime Minister Kishida, the combination of a strong Kantei and Kishida’s bottom-up, consensus-building leadership style generally made the prime minister and his policies less interesting to the media and the public.

In most cases, Kishida’s policies were formulated by Kantei staff and deliberative bodies under the prime minister, but with substantive contributions from LDP Diet members and the relevant administrative officials. The use of deliberative bodies directly under the prime minister is usually associated with top-down policymaking, but Kishida eschewed the approach of his predecessors, who issued explicit instructions that tended to predetermine the outcome. In some cases, Kishida inherited policies that had been conceived and deliberated earlier, by his predecessors Abe Shinzō or Suga Yoshihide.

Take economic policy. Early in his administration, Kishida set up the New Form of Capitalism Realization Headquarters inside the Cabinet Secretariat to oversee and coordinate his so-called new form of capitalism policies. In the realm of economic security, the groundwork had already been laid under the administration of Abe Shinzō: The LDP had launched the Strategic Headquarters on the Creation of a New International Order in June 2020, and the following December the committee had submitted a report recommending the legislation of a comprehensive economic security law during the 2022 regular session of the Diet. When Kishida took office, he set up a policy unit in the Cabinet Secretariat for preparing such legislation. After the legislation, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry took the lead in formulating regulations and other concrete measures to implement the policy. The expansion of NISA was overseen by Kishida’s right-hand man, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Kihara Seiji (as detailed in Nikkei, December 14, 2022). However, that and the other recommendation in the Doubling Asset-Based Income Plan incorporated the views of officials in the Financial Services Agency.

Thanks to this combination of centralized coordination and bottom-up consensus building, Kishida’s policies generated little internal friction for the most part and consequently attracted little media attention. The main exceptions were his proposal for a tax to finance the increase in defense spending and the plan to lift the ban on ridesharing services. Ordinarily, one would have expected the course change on nuclear energy to meet with stiff resistance, yet it passed without much political turmoil. Paradoxically, this lack of drama resulted in an unfairly low assessment of Kishida’s achievements.

The Need for a “Director”

Because of this paradox, Japanese prime ministers nowadays need competent strategic management to ensure that the public appreciates the progress the government is making on the policy front.

Kishida himself made little effort to explain his policies to the public. If asked to recall a Kishida catchphrase, most people would probably choose “the ability to listen.” This may be a good description of Kishida’s approach to policymaking, but it sheds no light on substances of the policies themselves. The “new form of capitalism” would probably come in second. This slogan is said to have originated with Kishida himself, but, it lacks specificity.

Under Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō (2001–6), Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy Takenaka Heizō performed the task of strategic management, ensuring that the prime minister received full credit for all major policy decisions. Imai Takaya, executive secretary to Prime Minister Abe, kept the Kantei focused on a few key policies at a time, concerned that if it undertook too many at once, the people’s attention would be scattered, and they would be unable to appreciate what Abe was doing and why.

Kishida’s government lacked this kind of direction. As a result, the prime minister’s decisions were never clearly explained, and important policies were often overshadowed by other political developments occurring around the same time.

For example, the brief period spanning May and June 2022 saw the enactment of the Economic Security Promotion Act, the Quad leaders’ meeting in Tokyo, and a cabinet decision on the revocation of “analog regulations.” The Doubling Asset-Based Income Plan, introducing an important new policy, was announced in November 2022, just as the media and the public were becoming fixated on the revision of the National Security Strategy and the cabinet’s plan to significantly boost defense spending. Release of the asset income doubling plan could easily have been delayed.

The government’s New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific was announced the day before Kishida traveled to Ukraine in March 2023. Inevitably, the trip to Kyiv captured all the media attention, and the Indo-Pacific plan received little attention. There was no compelling reason to release the plan at that time. Moreover, the government published its roadmap for boosting Japan’s birthrate in the same month.

Some will doubtless counter that there is little time to waste in the management of national affairs; given the government’s tight agenda, it has little choice but to move quickly from one key policy to the next. But in a democracy, it is also vital for the government to securing the people’s understanding for policies and the policy formulation process.

Brought Down by Scandals

Unless an administration makes a concerted effort to inform citizens about its achievements, negative media coverage tends to dominate, especially in the wake of political scandals. Such scandals can further erode public trust, making it even harder to secure understanding and support for policies. And there was no shortage of scandals to undermine the Kishida cabinet.

The first blow came in the aftermath of the July 2022 assassination of former Prime Minister Abe, which called attention to the close relationships between many LDP politicians and the widely discredited Unification Church. In October of that year, Kishida was forced to demand the resignation of one of his top ministers in connection with the scandal. Soon thereafter, three more ministers were ousted over public gaffes and financial scandals. Kishida sustained further damage in the spring of 2023, when it was revealed that his eldest son, hired as the prime minister’s executive secretary in the previous October, had held a private party in the Prime Minister’s Official Residence. Subsequently, three vice-ministers appointed as part of the September 2023 cabinet reshuffle were sacked for scandals. Finally, the slush-fund scandal emerged from around December 2023, ultimately bringing the Kishida administration down.

In at least two cases, the administration’s achievements were directly overshadowed by scandals occurring around the same time. The Doubling Asset-Based Income Plan received almost no attention because it was released in the fall of 2022, when attention was focused on a series of cabinet resignations. In April this year, Kishida traveled to the United States, where he and President Joe Biden signed a raft of agreements strengthening bilateral relations. Under ordinary circumstances, the trip would have raised the public’s appreciation of the Kishida administration’s accomplishments, but with all eyes fixed on the slush-fund scandal, it passed virtually unnoticed.

Conclusion

In the foregoing, I have attempted to explain two anomalies regarding the government of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio: first, his relatively long tenure despite low approval ratings, and second, the public’s low overall assessment of his administration despite its many achievements.

As we have seen, Kishida was able to stay in power because (1) he committed no fatal political errors, (2) he was able to push his legislative agenda through the Diet, and (3) the LDP saw no reason to oust Kishida before his term as president expired, given that a party leadership election scheduled for September 2024, a year before a general election would have to be held. We have also seen that his overall achievements as prime minister were underrated because of (1) flawed cabinet appointments, (2) the paradox of the powerful Kantei, and (3) the lack of a strong public-relations strategy. In a democracy, the people need to be able to grasp the process and content of policymaking.

The number and magnitude of scandals swirling around the government over the past two years were sufficient to bring any prime minister down. But they should not have negated Kishida’s achievements while in office. His experience underscores the need for centralized strategic planning, a “director” who ensures that the public can easily grasp not only the content of new policies but also the policymaking process and the prime minister’s role therein.

(Translated from “Enshutsuka o hitsuyō to shiteita seiken: Fushigi no saishō Kishida Fumio ron,” Chūō Kōron, October 2024, pp. 88–95; courtesy of Chūō Kōron Shinsha. Banner photo © Jiji.)