Ishiba Moves to Marginalize Abe Camp

In the September 27 election to replace Prime Minister Kishida Fumio as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, former Secretary General Ishiba Shigeru emerged victorious from a crowded field of nine candidates, assuring his designation as prime minister on October 1. Given his reputation as a gadfly within the ruling party, Ishiba seemed a propitious choice, sending the public a message that the LDP was ready to clean house after the public-relations disaster of the recent slush-fund scandal.

At the same time, Ishiba’s election, along with his subsequent appointments and his decision to hold a snap election (while denying certain politicians the party’s official endorsement), suggest that the ruling party is moving to repudiate the politics of the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, as more moderate forces gain traction.

How the public judges these developments will become clear when the voters head to the polls on October 27.

Rejecting Abe’s Legacy

Ishiba was by no means a shoo-in for the LDP’s top spot. In the first ballot, he was outpolled by Minister for Economic Security Takaichi Sanae, a staunch conservative and erstwhile Abe ally. But none of the nine candidates secured a majority, leading to a runoff between the top two vote getters. Former Environment Minister Koizumi Shinjirō, a charismatic young politician with a substantial following, had been favored to secure a place on the second ballot, but he lost momentum in the course of the campaign. His initial decision to run on a plan to loosen regulations governing the dismissal of employees was clearly a strategic error, and the derision provoked by some of his pronouncements—including his potential diplomatic bombshell along the lines of “I’ve never been to China, but I have been to Taiwan”—made party members queasy.

In the runoff, Ishiba narrowly beat out Takaichi despite his reputed unpopularity among LDP lawmakers. A critical number of Diet politicians and prefectural chapters appear to have backed away from Takaichi, reluctant to place the party’s leadership in the hands of someone closely associated with Abe’s ultraconservative politics and endorsed by many of the politicians implicated in the LDP slush-fund scandal.

It is owing to that scandal that public faith in the LDP has sunk to its lowest level since 2009, when voter frustration with the Liberal Democrats propelled the Democratic Party of Japan to power. At that time, the failure of a series of short-lived LDP administrations had sown doubt about the party’s capacity to govern. This time, the issue is a far-reaching political finance scandal, rekindling the persistent concerns about money in LDP politics and damaging the party’s credibility. Revelations that several LDP factions (particularly that formerly led by Abe) had routinely failed to report proceeds from fundraising events and channeled the money into faction members’ individual slush funds triggered a media frenzy and a public uproar comparable in scale to the devastating 1988 Recruit and 1992 Sagawa Kyūbin scandals (which contributed to the LDP’s ouster in 1993, the party’s first fall from power since its founding in 1955).

The “pendulum principle” that has periodically rescued the LDP from its own excesses seems to have come into play again, thanks to the realization that the party would never overcome the current crisis in confidence without changes to its internal power structure. So it was that the pendulum swung to the gadfly Ishiba, the candidate positioned furthest from the nucleus of political power over the past decade.

Return to “Mainstream” Politics

One’s first impression of Ishiba’s choice of top party and cabinet officers is that he has rewarded supporters; six of his ministers (including Internal Affairs and Communications Minister Murakami Seiichirō) and two deputy chief cabinet secretaries are politicians who endorsed his candidacy for LDP president. A closer look, however, reveals a more important trend: Ishiba has largely excluded adherents of Abe’s hawkish, ultraconservative foreign policy and fiscally expansionary economic strategy, instead filling the major cabinet and party posts with politicians who could be characterized as centrist, moderately conservative, or representative of “mainstream” LDP politics.

Epitomizing the establishment orientation of Ishiba’s party appointments are Suzuki Shun’ichi (son of former Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō), the new chair of the General Council; Obuchi Yūko (daughter of former Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō), chair of Party Organization and Campaign Headquarters; Koizumi Shinjirō (son of former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō), chair of the Election Strategy Committee; and Fukuda Tatsuo (son of former Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo), executive acting secretary-general.

For the key cabinet post of minister of finance, Ishiba tapped Katō Katsunobu, who ran against him in the LDP leadership election. Katō is a member of the recently dissolved Motegi faction and the son-in-law and adopted son of former Minister of Agriculture Katō Mutsuki. Hayashi Yoshimasa, a former Kishida faction member, has remained in the crucial post of chief cabinet secretary.

Altogether, Ishiba’s lineup is conspicuously lacking in fresh faces or any sign of a generational shift. In terms of the balance of power among the (former) factions, one might expect former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to wield considerable influence in the new government.

Ishiba’s Underwhelming Policy Speech

In his inaugural policy speech to the Diet on October 4, Ishiba pledged to promote a political culture that connects with the people and to build his policy around the five principles of upholding the rules, safeguarding Japan, protecting the people, revitalizing local communities, and ensuring opportunities for young people and women. Missing from these bullet points was an economic slogan or catchphrase along the lines of Abe’s “three arrows” or Kishida’s “new form of capitalism.” In fact, most of the economic policies outlined by Ishiba adhere to those of the Kishida administration. The only new initiative he has set forth so far is a commitment to “accelerate the implementation of a ¥1,500 minimum wage.”

Perhaps the closest thing Ishiba has to a signature economic policy is his pledge to spend more on regional revitalization. But even doubling the current budget allocation, as promised in the policy speech, would yield only around ¥200 billion, which seems insufficient to reverse the decline of Japan’s rural areas.

Similarly, the speech offered little that was new in the realm of foreign policy and security. During his campaign for LDP president, Ishiba repeatedly called for the formation of an Asian version of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and a revision of the Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan (SOFA), but neither proposal figured in his policy speech. This course correction was to be expected, given that both proposals constituted a clear departure from established government policy, and neither seemed feasible in the short term (although it should be possible to broach the subject of a SOFA revision). Ultimately, the speech was little more than an endorsement of Kishida’s foreign and security policies. The only original idea was the establishment of a ministerial council to work on improving the treatment of Self-Defense Forces personnel.

But Ishiba understands that the October 27 election is not about national policy. It is about coming to grips with the problem of money in LDP politics. With this in mind, he prevailed on the ruling party to withhold its official endorsement from some lower house candidates involved in the slush fund scandal and to penalize others who had run afoul of financial reporting requirements by denying them a place on the party’s regional proportional representation lists (meaning they must win in their single-seat districts to remain in the Diet).

It remains to be seen whether this response will satisfy the voters. In the final analysis, the LDP withheld its official endorsement from 12 candidates and denied another 3 the chance to run in one of the proportional representation blocks. But this still leaves a large number of candidates who have received the ruling party’s endorsement despite having violated political finance laws.

Outlook for a Factionless LDP

The big question is how—or whether—the LDP will change in the wake of the slush fund scandal, which led to the dissolution of the LDP factions as fundraising organizations.

For decades, these quasi-parties were integral to LDP politics. Diet members pledged their fealty to a faction leader in exchange for the promise of funding, election support, and recommendations for party and cabinet positions. The system led to abuses, but it had its advantages as well.

Traditionally, prime ministers have taken the factions’ recommendations into account when filling positions in the party and the cabinet. These recommendations greatly facilitated personnel appointments, since the candidates were, to some degree, prescreened with respect to their character and qualifications. Without that information, the process is bound to be much more difficult. This is doubtless why many of Ishiba’s vice-ministers in his initial cabinet are holdovers from the Kishida cabinet, focusing attention on how he might move to fill those positions after the election.

The factions also reflected the ideological orientation of their leaders and, as such, used their numbers to influence party and government policy.

At present, there are sharp divisions within the LDP on three basic policy issues: (1) whether to pursue aggressive regulatory reform or focus on compliance with current industry rules; (2) whether to maintain a conservative stance on such matters as the monarchy and Yasukuni Shrine; and (3) whether to maintain an expansionary fiscal and monetary policy or adopt a more hawkish line. What impact will the disbandment of the factions have on the government’s decision-making process?

The policy-making powers of the prime minister’s office have grown considerably. Against this background, the disbandment of the factions should make it easier for Ishiba to assert himself on such policy issues as those cited above, primarily because party members who disagree will have a harder time rallying the troops.

However, this assumes that the prime minister can lead the ruling party to victory in the coming election. Ishiba has set the bar for victory rather low, saying that he will view it as a win if the ruling coalition (including Kōmeitō) maintains its majority in the House of Representatives. But the LDP needs to do considerably better than that if Ishiba hopes to exercise strong political leadership. And even with a solid win, his ability to lead will depend heavily on the level of public support his administration can sustain going forward.

(Originally Published in Japanese. Banner photo: Newly designated Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, right, delivering his policy speech before the House of Representatives on October 4, 2024. © Jiji.)