In Defense of Japanese Aid to Ukraine

In the two and a half years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Japan has provided the Ukrainians with a steady stream of humanitarian aid, support for recovery and reconstruction, and other forms of nonlethal assistance. In the following, I assess Japan’s contribution from an international perspective, identify its distinguishing characteristics, and discuss the challenges Tokyo faces in sustaining its commitment to Ukraine.

World Ranking

How much aid has Japan provided to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in late February 2022, and how does that contribution compare with the efforts of other countries?

The Accord on Support for Ukraine and Cooperation Between the Government of Japan and Ukraine, signed on June 13 this year, states, “Japan has committed and provided . . . assistance worth a total value of 12 billion US dollars,” reflecting the Japanese government’s own calculations. The Ukraine Support Tracker published by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy puts the value of Japanese aid through the end of June 2024 a bit lower, at €9.1 billion, or a little less than $10 billion. Even so, the UST ranks Japan fifth in the world in the cumulative value of its support for Ukraine, behind the United States (€75.1 billion), Germany (€23.6 billion), Britain (€13.0 billion), and France (€12.0 billion).

That said, a very different ranking emerges when contributions are expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product. According to the UST, Denmark tops the list at 1.83% of GDP, followed by Estonia (1.66%), Lithuania (1.43%), and Latvia (1.35%). By this measure, the United States ranks twenty-third (0.35%), while Japan comes in at number 31, having contributed just 0.20% of GDP.

Vital Mine-Clearing Assistance

Mine clearing is a particularly pressing need for Ukraine at this time, and Japan has drawn on its accumulated know-how to provide invaluable support in this undertaking.

It has been estimated that as much as 174,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory, or close to one-third of the country’s total land area, is contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance, mostly deployed by Russian forces. Removing them all is expected to take at least a decade at an estimated cost of about $38 billion.

This is a field in which Japan boasts a wealth of experience, including its longtime support for demining operations in Cambodia. Since Russia launched its invasion, the Japanese government has supplied Ukraine with 50 compact landmine detectors and about 10 large mind-clearing machines through the Japan International Cooperation Agency. It has also provided Ukrainian mine-clearing personnel with training in the operation of the advanced machinery.

The demining program is being carried out in partnership with Cambodia, where Japan helped to remove millions of landmines beginning in the 1990s. The training of Ukrainian deminers is being conducted inside Cambodia.

Cambodia has not embraced sanctions against Russia, although it did vote in favor of the October 2022 UN resolution condemning Russia’s attempted annexation of four Ukrainian territories, as well as the February 2023 resolution demanding Russia’s withdrawal. Phnom Penh’s decision to partner with Japan to clear landmines in Ukraine demonstrates the kind of benefits Japanese assistance to war-torn countries can yield over the long term. It also contradicts the conventional wisdom that the wealthy industrial democracies are alone in assisting Ukraine and have received no support from the Global South.

Hosting International Forums

Under relentless attack from Russia, Ukrainian society is in a state of near-exhaustion, and the situation worsens as the invasion continues. In other words, as the war drags on, Ukraine’s need for assistance can only grow more urgent. Yet donor fatigue is apt to set in among its supporters.

Japan has played a key role in helping sustain the momentum through its ongoing participation in and also organization of large-scale international forums that provided opportunities for consultation on Ukraine and its needs. Indeed, this in itself should be seen as an important form of assistance. Through such meetings, Japan has helped build bridges between Kyiv and governments that were initially ambivalent about pledging their support.

In May 2023, for example, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy attended the Group of Seven Hiroshima Summit at Japan’s invitation. This was Zelenskyy’s first trip to East Asia since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, and it provided him with an opportunity not only to appeal directly to the G7 for continued support but also to meet with invited leaders from such Indo-Pacific countries as South Korea, Australia, and India.

Zelenskyy’s conference with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was particularly fruitful. Although India had criticized Russian aggression, it had shown little enthusiasm for coming to Ukraine’s aid. The May 2023 talks elicited a pledge from Modi that he and India would do “everything we can” to help Ukraine end the war, which in turn encouraged Zelenskyy to adopt a more proactive India diplomacy. Japan played a pivotal role in bringing the two countries together, a significant accomplishment.

Other Forms of Support

Despite widespread sympathy for Ukraine in the global community, Zelenskyy has struggled to win support for his Peace Formula, first submitted to the Group of 20 summit in November 2022. Ukraine’s Peace Formula is a set of 10 conditions for ending the war, including nuclear safety, release of all prisoners and return of deportees, full withdrawal of Russian military forces from Ukraine, and restoration of the Russia–Ukraine border to that prior to the 2014 annexation of Crimea (in accordance with Article 2 of the UN Charter). All are conditions vital to preventing future aggression by Russia and ensuring a lasting peace. Yet international awareness of the initiative remains low, and Kyiv’s efforts to gain support for it have progressed slowly.

Japan, however, has endorsed the plan ever since it was first released. The Japanese government has made explicit reference to the Peace Formula in numerous statements, including the aforementioned June 13 accord, and there can be no doubt that Kyiv has been greatly heartened by Tokyo’s support.

Japan has also won kudos from Ukraine for its wide-ranging humanitarian assistance. This includes winterization support for cities that have sustained damage to their energy infrastructure (financial aid to the energy sector, as well as supplies of such equipment as generators and solar lanterns), support for the nation’s healthcare system, and assistance with rehabilitation of seriously injured soldiers.

Confronting Ukraine’s Realities

We have seen that Japan has drawn on its strengths and experience in providing assistance to Ukraine and that it has received high marks from the Ukrainians for those efforts. What must we do to sustain this commitment going forward?

It seems to me that, at the most basic level, the challenges are (1) not to forget, and (2) to be accurately informed.

First, it is essential not to lose sight of the devastating impact the invasion continues to have on Ukrainian society precisely because it has continued this long. Russian missiles continue to hit children’s hospitals and other civilian structures, and the toll from these attacks climbs by the day. We need to confront this reality on a daily basis and heed the voices of Ukraine’s suffering people to remind ourselves of the ongoing need for assistance.

Second, it is vital to disseminate accurate information about Ukraine and the level of Japanese aid to that country. Critics of Japan’s aid program are fond of saying that the Japanese government has no business investing so much in Ukraine when our own people are in need. Let us all bear in mind that Japanese aid to Ukraine amounts to a mere 0.2% of our country’s GDP. We need a balanced debate that takes into account Japan’s considerable economic strength.

Another oft-heard argument is that it is pointless channeling aid to a corrupt state like Ukraine. It is true that government corruption is a longstanding problem in Ukraine, but before using that as a pretext for discontinuing aid, we need to form an accurate picture of Ukraine’s current situation.

Japan has been addressing this issue along with its G7 partners via the G7 Ambassadors’ Support Group for Ukraine, established in 2015. Through this framework, we are conducting meticulous surveys to gauge the extent of government corruption, advising the government on aspects in need of improvement, and providing the assistance needed to carry out those reforms. With the aid of these initiatives—which have worked synergistically with support for Ukraine’s integration into the EU—Ukraine’s own anti-corruption efforts have continued to make substantial progress even amid the ravages of war.

It is truly regrettable that so much Japanese discourse on Ukraine remains mired in the old stereotypes despite such progress. We need to update Japanese perceptions of public administration in Ukraine if we are to carry out an objective debate on assistance to that country.

Japan’s reputation has benefited greatly from Tokyo’s consistent support for Ukraine over the past two and a half years. By continuing to uphold and carry out that commitment we can further enhance the image of Japanese diplomacy as principled, steadfast, and reliable.

(Originally published in Japanese. Banner photo: Then Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, left, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signing the Accord on Support for Ukraine at the G7 Leaders’ Summit in Apulia, Italy, June 13, 2024. © Kyōdō.)