Bracing for a More Insular America: Japan’s Take on the US Election

The 2024 US presidential election race is like none other. As of the time of the party primaries, the Democratic candidate was incumbent Joe Biden and the Republican candidate former President Donald Trump. However, Biden’s lackluster performance in the first presidential debate at the end of June added to concerns about his age. In July, Trump survived an attempt on his life and came out looking like a strong leader, in a development that appeared to give him an advantage overnight. However, after growing calls from within the Democratic Party for Biden to step down, the 81-year-old was eventually replaced as presidential candidate by Vice President Kamala Harris, again changing the dynamics.

Opinion polls put Trump and Harris neck and neck in swing states. In the Midwest Rust Belt and other battlegrounds, support for the Democratic and Republican Parties is even. It is therefore undecided voters who will determine the outcome of the election. Both in swing states and in other parts of the country, the economy, followed by illegal immigration, are the issues closest to voters’ hearts. There is therefore no way that foreign policy issues—even support for Ukraine and ceasefire negotiations in Gaza—will become significant factors in determining the outcome of the election.

In this article, I will look at what the presidential candidates have said and promised so far, and who they are advised by, and on the basis of this predict what United States foreign policy might look like after the election. Of course, with both candidates yet to finalize their transition teams, the assumptions made here are tentative at best.

Harris: An Unknown Quantity on Foreign Policy

A former district attorney, Kamala Harris lacks any significant philosophy or experience in international relations. While her role as vice president in the Biden administration saw her tour Asia and attend security conferences in Europe, she did so only as the president’s representative. When Biden assigned Harris responsibility for Central and South American immigration policy, she did not deliver. This considered, Harris’s foreign policy looks set to carry on along the path forged by the Biden administration. She will place emphasis on multilateralism and alliances, and work on global, cross-border issues like climate change and disease control. Specifically, she is expected to continue to support Ukraine in partnership with Europe, and attempt to balance support for both Israel and Palestine, while remaining committed to a two-state solution.

While Harris will treat China as America’s greatest rival, and try to prevent the outflow of state-of-the-art technology to that nation, militarily, she will aim to manage disputes through deterrence and crisis management. She is also expected to continue to support Taiwan’s efforts to bolster its own defenses. Harris does place importance on multilateral frameworks like the United Nations and G7, although, mindful of working-class families in swing states, she will be forced to distance herself from the CPTPP, or Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and other fair-trade agreements and market-opening arrangements.

That said, should Harris become president, she is expected to bring her own style to the presidency, rather than simply continuing Biden’s foreign policy. She is likely to do more than the current president on human rights issues. For example, the India has hit back at Harris’s condemnation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hinduist government. While India’s strategic importance for the United States is increasing, a Harris presidency could place limitations on United-States-India relations and the Quad (comprising Japan, Australia, India, and the United States), which aims for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” If Harris steps up criticism of China’s human rights abuses against Uyghurs, it will accelerate the escalation of the China-US confrontation.

Furthermore, the current vice president lacks foreign policy experience, and it is anyone’s guess what will happen if she interacts with the likes of Putin and Xi while still wearing her prosecutor’s hat. We cannot rule out the possibility that her counterparts will see through her lack of experience. During the 2020 primaries, Harris also came out against tariffs. She hails from the US West Coast, which prides itself on a strong trade sector, and voters are watching to see whether she will express an intention to bring about some kind of change in commercial policy.

Who Harris nominates to advise her on foreign policy is also important. While presidential candidates usually put together their transition teams in the spring of an election year, the Democratic candidate was selected at the last minute, and has yet to put a team together. Most importantly, there is almost no one in her circle who could be described as a “foreign policy advisor.” It is predicted that Philip Gordon, now national security advisor to the vice president, and other members of Harris’s staff will become more influential. Harris and Gordon share an explicit awareness of the limitations of America’s power and a philosophy of self-constraint when it comes to foreign intervention.

While the Biden administration pushed through a bill to withdraw the US armed forces from Afghanistan and has at times been overly cautious about supporting Ukraine, these tendencies could become even more pronounced under a Harris presidency. It is possible that President Harris would take an extremely cautious stance on military intervention in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

An Inconsistent Trump Camp

What if Donald Trump is re-elected? Based on the former president’s foreign policy record and statements made during his first term, it is safe to say that he will increase tariffs and take America back out of the Paris Agreement on climate change once again. On tariffs, Trump’s main trade policy objective in his first term was to reduce America’s trade deficit. In a second term, he would likely concentrate on restoring domestic industry, as part of his industrial policy. He will absolutely not join the CPTPP, and may even withdraw from the Japan-US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, on the grounds that it does not give the United States access to overseas markets.

On military alliances with Japan and other nations, Trump is likely to demand that partners contribute more financially and be more autonomous, while applying pressure and hard bargaining on the likes of Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and other authoritarian states. While Trump has expressed interest in brokering a ceasefire in Ukraine, he has not said exactly how he would go about it.

Within Trump’s circle, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien are calling for increased military support for Ukraine, while Keith Kellog (national security advisor to Vice President Mike Pence), Fred Fleitz (former chief of staff and secretary of the National Security Council), and others are calling for the withdrawal of support. It is anyone’s guess which side Trump will listen to should he be re-elected.

With respect to NATO, Trump may place limitations on the invocation of collective self-defense for member states that spend less than 2% of their GDP on defense. In the Middle East, Trump is likely to further increase support for Israel while cutting support for Palestine. He is also opposed to a two-state solution. Furthermore, the former president is an unknown quantity when it comes to East Asia policy. He might maintain his strategic ambiguity while using Taiwan as a diplomatic card in trade negotiations with China. He might also conceivably enter into arms control negotiations with North Korea, on the assumption that the nation has nuclear weapons.

The Trump camp’s think tank, the America First Policy Institute, which is opposed to support for Ukraine, has yet to decide on major appointments, including the leader of the transition team that was announced in August. Specific appointments are not expected to be made until after the election, and at the moment, it is hard to predict how the balance of power between internationalists close to Trump and the MAGA camp will play out.

LDP Needs to Go on Charm Offensive

Let me finish by touching on the United States’ relationship with Japan. While a second Trump administration would bring challenges like tariff policy, the Japanese government should still have room to negotiate, thanks to the relationships it has maintained with former Ambassador to Tokyo Bill Hagerty (seen as a favorite for secretary of state) and other high officials from the last Trump administration.

In the event of a Harris win, it is expected that many Biden administration staff will be retained, and therefore no significant disruption is forecast in the short term. However, there are many in Harris’s own circle, including relatives and California-based contacts, whom the Japanese side has yet to form sufficient relationships with. These people need to be identified, and relationships formed.

In either eventuality, Japan’s leader will need to promptly consolidate his own power base, and establish a good relationship with his American counterpart.

(Originally published in Japanese. Banner photo: Former President Donald Trump faced off against Vice President Kamala Harris in a heated presidential debate in Philadelphia on September 10, 2024. © Reuters.)