A Trump 2.0 Administration and the US-Japan Alliance: Little Reason for Uneasiness

Like in many other countries, Japanese debates over the best response to Donald Trump’s potential return to the American presidency have gained momentum of late. In fact, the phrase moshitora—shorthand for “What if it’s Trump?”—has become a regular part of the Japanese political lexicon. Below I share some reflections on what a Trump 2.0 administration could mean for the US-Japan relationship.

Rivalry with China, a Stable Alliance with Japan

Currently, the US-Japan alliance is stable. As the United States continues to view China as its biggest geopolitical rival, Japan’s value in American strategic calculations has only increased over time. As a treaty ally that hosts American military bases and constitutes a large part of the “first island chain” that constrains Chinese power projection into the Pacific, Japan retains importance for the United States simply by virtue of its location.

There is little indication that a second Trump administration would move away from this confrontational stance toward Beijing. After all, it was the former Trump administration that first explicitly positioned China as the United States’ biggest geopolitical rival in the 2017 National Security Strategy. The document forthrightly noted that “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests,” and that both countries are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” The NSS goes on to say that sustaining a favorable balance of power “will require a strong commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners.”

To be sure, such words reflected the perception of the National Security Council staff at the time, and not necessarily President Trump himself. Trump—then and now—believes in taking a tougher stance against allies who free ride on American military power. He is less critical, however, of allies who he perceives are sharing a reasonable burden.

For example, take Trump’s comments in a speech in South Carolina in February this year that caused a global stir. He recounted a story where a “president of a big country” asked whether the United States would still protect them “if we don’t pay” their NATO obligations and were attacked by Russia. According to President Trump, his purported response was “No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You got to pay. You got to pay your bills.”

The important thing here is that Trump seems predominantly concerned about whether other countries are living up to their financial obligations “to pay”. In a contrast with the first Trump administration, this might now be a stabilizing factor for Japan as Prime Minister Fumio has already committed to dramatically upgrading Japan’s defense capabilities while increasing its defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2027.

Another important part of the picture for US-Japan relations as it relates to a potential Trump 2.0 administration is what kind of people will shape his second term foreign and security policies. Names mentioned include former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien (who served in 2019–21), Elbridge Colby, deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development (2017–18), and Michael Pillsbury, senior fellow for China strategy at the Heritage Foundation and former director for China strategy at the Hudson Institute.

All three are experts who believe in taking a tough stance toward China and support a pro-Taiwan foreign policy orientation. If these individuals are heavily involved in shaping the foreign policy of a Trump White House, this will further contribute to US-Japan alliance stability.

Top Priorities for Trump 2.0

Understanding Trump’s top priorities if he is re-elected is also important. It seems likely that a major Trump priority will be to use his presidential powers to deal with the four criminal prosecutions against him and the civil lawsuits against his real estate company, the Trump Organization. If he does not, it is entirely possible that when his second term comes to an end after four years, he could lose his business interests and even his personal fortune.

During his former presidency, Trump often asserted that he had the power to pardon himself. It is not entirely clear if this is true. When President Richard Nixon was about to be prosecuted for the Watergate scandal, the Justice Department’s position at the time was that the president did not have the authority to pardon himself. However, Nixon resigned from office before impeachment by Congress and did not test this position.

Exactly one month after Nixon’s resignation, President Gerald Ford (Nixon’s vice-president and next in the line of presidential succession) pardoned Nixon before indictment on the grounds that it would save the nation from division. This pardon was heavily criticized at the time. Due in part to Nixon’s diplomatic achievements, President Ford’s act has, however, come to be viewed in a more positive light over time. Nixon, along with Henry Kissinger (his national security advisor), successfully led the United States out of the quagmire of the Vietnam War. Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1973 for his work as a special envoy of the Nixon administration in putting together the Paris Peace Accords with the North Vietnamese government in January of the same year. If not for the Watergate scandal unfolding at the time, both Nixon and Kissinger would have won the prize.

Trump’s own insistence that he deserves a Nobel Peace Prize is therefore likely to be similarly calculated. The diplomatic priorities of the Trump 2.0 administration are likely to be Nobel-worthy diplomatic achievements, such as his stated desire to see a ceasefire in Ukraine within 24 hours of his inauguration. If this were to be achieved, it could increase the likelihood of justifying and receiving a presidential pardon should his vice-president at some point be elevated to the presidency.

It is therefore likely that a second Trump administration will prioritize diplomatic achievements that can be achieved within a single term. A ceasefire in Ukraine and a nuclear agreement in North Korea are therefore likely to be priorities, while more challenging issues such as a deal with China over the status of Taiwan are liable to be given lower priority. The latter issue in particular will likely encounter resistance from within Trump’s own administration.

Another Personalized Alliance Relationship?

The US-Japan alliance, which can be used to put pressure on China, will be an important diplomatic tool for President Trump given his commitment to economic competition with China. With only one term left to achieve his objectives, he will have to maintain a steady focus on tackling those issues with all his administration’s resources. Japan could therefore be of significant help for achieving Trump’s objectives.

Indeed, one of the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s most notable diplomatic successes was building a personal relationship with Trump during his first term. Can a contemporary Japanese leader replicate this? Prime Minister Abe had certain advantages, such as heading a stable government supported by a core conservative support base within the ruling party. He also had robust popular support. Abe himself also considered the maintenance of a strong alliance with the United States to be an overriding national interest. He was prepared to build a constructive personal relationship with whoever became the American president.

When I spoke to a colleague from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Abe administration, they noted that it was Abe’s respectful treatment of President Trump that enabled him to build a good relationship. By contrast, other Western leaders avoided paying respect or were even disrespectful.

For example, footage was released showing Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson joking about Mr. Trump’s lengthy impromptu press conference at the December 2019 NATO summit. This led to President Trump cancelling a planned postsummit conference and returning home early. He later called Prime Minister Trudeau “two-faced.”

One can imagine Trump felt isolated and disconnected from the elite Atlantic club atmosphere of the NATO Summit. For most NATO partners, an appreciation of the alliance itself and the democratic values that underpin it are taken as given. Mr. Trump, on the other hand, does not share such a worldview.

By contrast, in November 2017, almost two years before the NATO Summit, Prime Minister Abe played golf with Trump during his visit to Japan. Another MOFA colleague shared that, during their round, Trump asked Abe in detail about the type of atmosphere he would find at G7 summits. Having had little experience of international meetings, he must have sought out this kind of intimacy with Abe based on a belief that it would be difficult to ask elitist European leaders.

Prime Minister Kishida, or whoever becomes Japan’s leader following him, could learn a lot from Abe’s approach. Treating Trump with respect is not difficult for conservative Japanese politicians—but merely being polite will not be enough to build a personal relationship. It also requires domestic political capital.

The Trump administration started in January 2017, more than four years after the second Abe administration was formed in 2012, when the Japanese leader still had a high approval rating. This stable base of support gave Abe enough political capital to bounce back from criticism from opposition parties and the liberal media about his approach to Trump.

If a second Trump administration comes to pass, it will be inaugurated in January 2025. It is unlikely that whoever is the Japanese prime minister at that time will have the same political capital that Abe enjoyed in 2017. Prime Minister Kishida, who served as foreign minister in the Abe administration, has been in power since October 2021. This is relatively long for a Japanese prime minister, but Kishida’s current approval rating is low. There are serious doubts about whether he can come out on top in the autumn LDP presidential election and continue his premiership.

Therefore, one can only speculate whether the Japanese leader in January 2025 will be able to establish a constructive personal relationship with Trump, should he win reelection. The good news for Tokyo is that Japan as an ally is more geopolitically important than ever before. With a prospective Trump 2.0 administration likely to be staffed with people whose worldviews align with Japan’s current strategic priorities, this further bodes well for Tokyo being able to build a constructive relationship with whoever becomes the next American president.

(Originally published in Japanese on July 2, 2024. Banner photo: Former President Donald Trump speaks at a rally on his seventy-eighth birthday in West Palm Beach, Florida, near his Mar-a-Lago residence, on June 14, 2024. © AFP/Jiji.)