Policy Challenges for China and the Region Under Trump 2.0: Tough Choices Ahead for Japan

A month into the second administration of US President Donald Trump, opinions diverge widely as to the trajectory of US-China relations and East Asian diplomacy over the next four years. There are only a few basic assumptions on which most observers can agree.

First, while we can see some degree of continuity with the administration of President Joe Biden, we must also be prepared for substantial discontinuities, especially those stemming from the personality and idiosyncrasies of President Trump himself. Second, despite obvious similarities with the first Trump administration, also rooted in Trump’s own proclivities, we can identify a number of differences, beginning with the speed with which cabinet members and other key appointments were announced this time around. Third, in the wake of such developments as the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the international situation is much altered since the first Trump administration.

With these premises in mind, let us explore the foreign-policy implications of Trump 2.0 for China, Taiwan, and Japan.

Continuity with the Biden Administration

Economic tensions between the United States and China have escalated since February 2025, with Trump raising or slapping tariffs on a variety of Chinese imports and China retaliating with duties of its own. To many, these volleys look very much like the prelude to an all-out trade war, but the broader outlines of Trump’s China strategy remain unclear.

Where tariffs are concerned, China is thus far just one target among many, America’s partners and allies included. China will need to see how it fits into the bigger picture in order to calibrate its own response. This is doubtless one reason Beijing’s reaction has been relatively muted so far. The Chinese were also better prepared for what was coming this time around. From Trump 1.0, Beijing was well acquainted with the president’s focus on tariffs and emphasis on energy and food. His swift personnel decisions helped put Beijing on notice as well.

Of course, tariffs and trade are just one aspect of Washington’s China policy. On the foreign-policy and security front, Trump’s leadership team includes such confirmed China hawks as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eldridge Colby. From a Trumpian perspective, they would doubtless be characterized as heirs to hardliners like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger from the second half of the first Trump administration. But they also inherit the Biden administration’s policies vis-a-vis economic security and Taiwan. Here again, Beijing has reacted with relative equanimity in the face of developments consistent with its previous experience and expectations.

No Clear China Strategy

How will Trump’s China policy diverge from Biden’s? The biggest difference is likely to be in the basic policy framework.

Under Joe Biden, both Washington and Beijing viewed the relationship as a tough, long-term strategic rivalry but supported direct dialogue to manage a complex relationship, avoiding outright clashes while pursuing cooperation where possible. And in fact, although ties between the two countries remained strained, direct dialogue continued, and a certain level of cooperation was seen in such areas as climate change.

The second Trump administration also views China as a strategic competitor, but apart from this perception, Biden’s policy framework is unlikely to survive. While it remains to be seen what sort of coherent China policy, if any, emerges from the mixture of Trump’s mercantilist impulses and the ideological hard line of his foreign-policy team, bilateral cooperation seems much less likely, particularly given Trump’s indifference to climate change and other environmental issues. Direct dialogue also poses a challenge, inasmuch as Secretary of State Rubio has been barred from entering China.

For China, accordingly, a great deal hinges on the outcome of top-level talks between Xi Jinping and Trump, with their inevitable focus on tariffs. Until a basic framework emerges from such dialogue, very little can be achieved through working-level or ministerial negotiations.

The basic problem from China’s standpoint is that the new tariffs Trump has threatened are based less on any understanding of China than on the America First logic of holding other countries accountable for such domestic problems as illegal immigration and the influx of fentanyl. It will be difficult for Xi to make any progress in top-level negotiations without implicitly accepting this Trumpian logic.

China in the Global Context

As noted above, Beijing will need to assess the bigger picture of foreign policy under Trump 2.0, including US diplomacy toward Russia, Ukraine, and the Middle East, before it can chart its own policy in response. This is not to suggest that China is a passive player on the global stage. But in respect to areas of US foreign policy that remain difficult to forecast, Beijing appears to be adopting a wait-and-see approach.

Taking a bird’s-eye view of US foreign policy, we can probably surmise that the Trump administration will concentrate initially on Europe and the Middle East before turning its attention to East Asia. Let us take a brief survey of the global environment surrounding US-China relations.

On the European front, Trump has been moving quickly on his pledge to orchestrate a peace in Ukraine, but this has increased tensions with the European Union, whose leaders insist on being involved. Trump’s disdainful attitude toward America’s European allies could push the EU closer to China, something that Beijing would doubtless welcome with open arms. On the other hand, the Chinese might be less sanguine about an entente between Washington and Moscow. To be sure, China has little to fear in terms of a total thaw in US-Russia relations given the ideological slant of Trump’s current foreign policy team. But even a strategic rapprochement would be cause for concern if it compromised the “rock solid” Sino-Russian partnership that Beijing relies on in its bid to challenge Western economic leadership and ultimately overtake the United States.

In the Middle East, the outlook for China has deteriorated of late. Not long ago, it was in a position to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran, but recent developments have boosted Israel’s relative power and threatened China’s position as the top buyer of Middle Eastern oil and natural gas.

Generally speaking, China’s status as a global political player has deteriorated further as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. The fear of a “Sino-Russian monolith” remains strong within the former Western bloc and among Russia’s vulnerable neighbors. Moreover, as a leader of the non-Western world, China is facing challenges from such emerging powers as India and Turkey. In this environment, President Xi may welcome a one-on-one with Trump as an opportunity to reaffirm his relevance to international affairs, both at home and abroad.

China and America’s Allies

In the past, China has often responded to uncertainty in the international environment by strengthening or mending ties with its closest neighbors, and that pattern is holding today, as Beijing waits for the Trump administration’s China policy to unfold. Another major item on China’s diplomatic agenda is improving relations with America’s friends and allies while working to exploit divisions between Washington and its partners. This strategy has gained steam thanks to the perception that Trump places little value on its traditional ties with “like-minded countries” or on such multilateral frameworks as NATO, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States), the Five Eyes Anglosphere intelligence alliance (Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States), and the trilateral security pacts Washington has forged in East Asia with Japan and South Korea on the one hand and Japan and the Philippines on the other.

With regard to South Korea, Beijing has reason to hope that a more pro-Chinese administration will soon take the reins. The Chinese government has adopted a more conciliatory tone toward the government of President Bongbong Marcos in the Philippines and has even made overtures to Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru. Beijing was doubtless encouraged by Ishiba’s previous reputation as an advocate for an independent foreign policy, his relationship with the late Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (under whose leadership Japan and China established ties in 1972), and his decision to exclude politicians from the former Abe faction (known for its deep ties with Taiwan) from his cabinet. From this standpoint, the outcome of Ishiba’s February 7 meeting with Trump was a huge disappointment and reality check for Beijing. Although the joint leaders’ statement downplayed the theme of shared values stressed by Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, it reaffirmed Japan-US security ties and went a step further in terms of articulating support for Taiwan.

Trump 2.0 and Taiwan

Trump’s diplomatic and security team has thus far reaffirmed and even strengthened the Biden administration’s position in support of Taiwan, including the removal in mid-February of a key phrase from a State Department fact sheet stating that the United States does no support Taiwan independence. This suggests that we may anticipate a continuation of such policies as the sale of US arms to Taiwan.

At the same time, Trump himself has been putting pressure on Taipei with ominous references to chips and the threat of sweeping tariffs. Trump certainly appears to view China as America’s biggest strategic competitor over the long term, but it remains unclear to what extent he is willing to challenge the One China policy. Meanwhile, Under Secretary of Defense Colby and others have been stressing the need for Taiwan to commit more to its own defense and depend far less on the United States. Such messages are breeding considerable anxiety among the Taiwanese.

Uncertainty also surrounds the future of recent US initiatives to help Taiwan circumvent its diplomatic isolation by joining minilateral frameworks, such as the Japan-US-Philippines triad. In short, the Trump administration’s Taiwan policy (like its China policy) is still inchoate and will require close watching going forward.

New Challenges for Japan

As noted above, Ishiba’s visit to Washington was more successful than anticipated. But Japan is by no means out of the woods.

Gone are the simplicity and clarity of international relations in the Cold War era, when Japan had little to do but hold up its end of the Japan-US Security Treaty. In today’s highly complex, multidimensional environment, we must adopt a more active, independent approach to foreign policy, one that goes beyond our traditional focus on international frameworks and the Group of Seven. We must take into account the circumstances of each region and country, operating simultaneously on the global, regional, multilateral, and bilateral levels.

This will entail new modes of diplomacy. When it comes to our dealings with the United States, the challenge will be responding to the domestic political forces driving Trump’s policies. But Japan also needs to strengthen its ties with other members of the industrial world in light of Trump’s unpredictability and lack of ideological cohesion. It must work actively to open the lines of communication with China as dialogue between Washington and Beijing falters. At the same time, it must pursue a foreign policy open to the diverse voices of the Global South and act as a bridge between South and North.

This is the daunting challenge facing Japanese diplomacy in the Trump 2.0 era.

(originally published in Japanese. Banner Phioto: This combination of pictures created on February 04, 2025 shows, L-R, US President Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House on February 3, 2025, in Washington, DC and China’s President Xi Jinping speaking in Macau on December 19, 2024. © AFP/Jiji.)