Japan in the Post–3/11 Era: The Road to Rebirth

Crisis Management in the Aftermath of 3/11

Politics Society

Kobe 1995 and Tōhoku 2011 were both earthquake disasters, but the first saw most deaths from fires and collapsed homes, while the second was a complex disaster involving a tsunami and nuclear power plant meltdowns. Former director of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office Ōmori Yoshio considers Japan’s crisis management in the light of these two events.

The Political Leadership Masquerade

The Democratic Party of Japan government has bungled repeatedly in its response to the disaster. In particular, it has failed to collect information from administrative organizations in an appropriate manner, and the orders issued by the prime minister’s office under the name of political leadership have been nakedly opportunistic. Delays in issuing clear instructions, along with repeated corrections and amendments, have led to a fatal loss of credibility.

But perhaps the gravest problem lay with the mechanism for crisis management itself. One reason was the lack of any system to allow the government to take responsibility for supervising and overseeing nuclear power stations, and a lack of the necessary expertise that would have allowed the government to direct TEPCO more effectively. We need to learn from the example of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and train specialist units in the Self-Defense Forces to take responsibility for nuclear power.

A second problem is that at present it is extremely difficult to make the transition from regular conditions to a state of emergency. As I note above, the lack of any provisions for special emergency powers in the Constitution lies at the heart of this problem. In order to avoid a repetition of the bitter experiences of the Hanshin earthquake 16 years ago, we need to have a national debate as a matter of urgency about giving the prime minister special rights and executive prerogatives in the event of a state of emergency.

The third problem was the lack of any appropriate venue for discussing the possibility of a nuclear accident. It was felt that introducing measures based on the assumption on a worst-case scenario would only spark anxiety. For this reason, the necessary measures were never introduced and the few people who warned of the dangers of nuclear power saw their arguments ignored or suppressed. Perhaps this cautious approach was prompted by consideration for Japanese sensitivity to nuclear issues after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But the time for sentiment is over. Japan needs to take this opportunity to learn from the example of France and other countries. We need to make absolutely sure that there is no contradiction between the nuclear safety structure and our plans for an emergency response if and when the worst comes to pass.

(Originally written in Japanese.)

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