A Former Ambassador’s Prescription for Japan in Dealing with “Trump 2.0”

A Loyal Cabinet Out for Revenge?

In Donald Trump’s first term as US president, perhaps aware of his lack of experience at high levels of government, he tapped a number of people to serve in his cabinet as “the grownups in the room,” such as James Mattis, with deep experience in the US Marines’ command operations, as secretary of defense and the business executive Rex Tillerson as secretary of state. In the end, though, it must be said that this approach did little good for the Trump administration.

For “Trump 2.0,” he is taking a different approach, choosing people whose primary quality is absolute loyalty to him. For secretary of defense, he is going with Pete Hegseth, a commentator with the right-leaning Fox News whose military experience only extends to achieving the rank of major in the National Guard. The antivaccination crusader Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has been tapped as secretary of health and human services. A handful of people with notable resumes have been picked, such as the campaign strategist Susie Wiles as White House chief of staff, the congressman Mike Waltz as national security advisor, Senator Marco Rubio as secretary of state, and the hedge-fund manager Scott Bessent as secretary of the treasury. But for a range of intelligence- and security-related positions, including the Justice Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, he has tapped people who might not so charitably be described as “revenge picks,” expected to “get back” at those Trump feels has wronged him.

One particularly interesting development this time around has been the open conflict between Steve Bannon, a key advisor to Trump for much of his first term in office, and the industrialist Elon Musk, who has recently hitched his wagon to Trump’s team. Musk is an “evil person,” Bannon has said, even while pledging that he and others in the “Make America Great Again” crowd will do what they can to support Trump’s administration from the outside. It remains to be seen, though, whether the fact that they have not been allowed back into the inner circle this time will cause further friction. Trump’s base is by no means monolithic.

“Crazy Talk” on the International Stage?

A common refrain about Trump is that he is utterly unpredictable—nobody knows what he might say or do next. If one stops to think about it, though, it becomes clear that the best predictor of Trump’s future actions has long been his own statements. To view him as a person who cannot be predicted is only playing into his own hands, in fact. Trump himself, for instance, has noted that China’s Xi Jinping is less likely to embark on provocative military action against Taiwan because he thinks the US leader is “crazy.”

This brings us to Trump’s recent comments on Greenland and the Panama Canal. His stated desire for Denmark to hand the former over to the United States, and for America to secure the return of the latter, go far beyond anything we might expect to hear from a stable leader. But if we give some thought to the background here, they are not all that far beyond the pale.

Greenland, first of all, is a colony of sorts to the Danish government, originally inhabited mainly by Inuit peoples. They have no particular loyalty to Copenhagen. Moreover, Greenland is thought to be the site of considerable deposits of rare earths and other natural resources, which makes China’s recent moves to increase its presence there something we should not ignore.

The Panama Canal, meanwhile, was completed by Americans after a first abortive attempt by the French to clear a channel across the isthmus. Previously under Colombian control, Panama gained nominal independence with American help, and was effectively under US control until the administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977–81). Today the canal facilities themselves are managed by a Hong Kong corporation.

In the cases of both Greenland and Panama, it has to be said that Trump’s statements—as off the wall as they are—have some grounding in historical, legal, economic, and security concerns.

Trump has also notably said that he does not leave the use of force off the table when addressing these issues. This is a hard pill to swallow, since an erosion of the rule of law could well lead to conditions where “might makes right,” and armed power is the took to change the status quo. For the time being, though, these are just verbal statements from the president that have yet to be reflected in actual policy. This disconnect between words and action is historically nothing new from the United States, a country that played a pivotal role in establishing frameworks like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Criminal Court, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership before declining to formally take part in any of them.

A similar thread can be detected in recent American moves to prevent the Nippon Steel takeover of US Steel. Superpowers place obsessive focus on issues of territory and core industries, here including food, energy, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and steelmaking. The United States boasts top levels of self-sufficiency in food and energy, and while the nation has fallen behind in the semiconductor field, it is working to catch up. In AI, American companies lead the world. And when it comes to steel, there is recognition that this is a vital resource going into everything from automobiles to buildings.

Nippon Steel’s takeover bid has triggered numerous comments along the lines of “it was poor timing to try to accomplish this in a presidential election year,” or “the names of the companies involved, directly referencing Japan and America, were an unfortunate factor.” I feel these statements are somewhat misleading, though. We should view this as a simple case of a powerful nation that has always maintained control over its steel industry seeking to hold on to that domestic control.

Lourenco Goncalves, CEO of rival US steelmaker Cleveland-Cliffs, made a splash when he waded into this fray with his accusations that an “evil” Japan had not learned anything from its loss to America in World War II. There is no need for the Japanese government to issue statements each and every time talk like this hits the media, of course, but Tokyo should stand ready to offer aid to Japanese corporations when it is needed. If they receive unfair treatment, the Japanese authorities should make appeals to overseas governments and resist those moves; we cannot leave decisions that negatively impact our firms entirely up to other entities.

Elon Musk as a Liability

Leaving aside the questions of Trump’s statements on Greenland and Panama, we should pay close attention to Trump confidante Elon Musk’s words on the global stage. Dipping his toes in foreign policy waters, in a December 20, 2024, post on X (formerly Twitter), Musk stated “Only the AfD can save Germany,” expressing support for the far-right populist party Alternative für Deutschland ahead of German parliamentary elections in late February. He has also used his X platform to drag down UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. These actions do nothing but harm to American diplomatic interests.

One expects that the incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz would prefer that Musk keep his mouth shut. In response to criticism of his comment on German politics, Musk has stated that his automaker Tesla has built plants in Germany, giving him the right to talk about matters there. But this sort of offensive bluster—like slapping a person across the face with a wad of cash—creates the very worst image that America has to present to the world. This is a purely negative development for the United States.

Seemingly in the wake of Musk, the billionaire chief of X and Tesla, other tech titans like Meta and Amazon, once seen as firmly in the Democratic camp, have been shifting their positions to the right and offering support to team Trump. From Japan, too, Softbank head Son Masayoshi dashed off to the United States to promise $100 billion in investment over the coming four years. It appears as though the global tech industry, fearful of being frozen out of a Trump regime rewarding only X, is rushing to curry favor with the incoming administration—one that is clearly viewed as being powerful enough to command such attention.

Keeping the G7 Afloat

Any consideration of the international political landscape in the years to come must rest on a recognition of the continuing significance of the Group of Seven nations. I served as the “sherpa,” the representative of Japan’s prime minister, during preparations for G8 summits (which included Russia as a participant) while George W. Bush was US president. The America of that time, too, tended to do as it pleased on the global stage. At the 2003 summit in Evian, France, President Bush, despite being slated to take part in the full two days of top-level talks, left after a single day due in part to French opposition to the US war against Iraq.

Donald Trump, too, during his first term, eschewed multilateral diplomacy in favor of one-on-one talks giving him a chance to use US might to twist the arms of his counterparts.

The G7 framework is different, though. The leaders of all member states are seated together at a small table, with just one assistant each standing behind them to help in the talks. The G7 atmosphere also differs considerably from the G20 meetings, with their far larger memberships, not to mention even larger gatherings like those of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the United Nations, or the International Monetary Fund. These vast gatherings feature dozens, or hundreds, of participants, delivering one 10-minute address each, rendering them little more than international speech contests. There is little meaningful exchange of opinions here.

US President Barack Obama once quipped that the era of the G7 had come to a close, and it was the G20 that was now the “premier forum” for international dialogue. I cannot agree with this take. Now that the UN Security Council has lost its ability to function properly and the G20 is threatened by ongoing Sino-American friction, the G7 is more valuable than ever. Japan is not a part of the European Union and from this year onward is no longer a nonpermanent member of the UNSC. It is of vital importance to Japan to keep the G7 from falling apart.

We must keep the G7 process moving forward, even if it is in a low-key manner compared to previous years. We must bring Trump to the table to take part in those talks that he dislikes so much, in pursuit of some sort of results, in order to prevent the framework from disintegrating entirely. True, conditions may become still more dire in four years if Trump’s vice president, JD Vance, steps into the Oval Office. But for the time being our attention must remain focused on the task before us.

If Japan is to successfully navigate the Trump 2.0 era, it will need more than anything to craft a unified domestic approach. There is only so much we might expect from a Japanese leader enjoying good chemistry with President Trump. Think of the global leaders who enjoyed solid relations with Trump during his first term: North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the Philippines’ Rodrigo Duterte. All of these figures enjoyed overwhelming domestic support—something that appeals to Trump, who sees this as a strength making the person worth dealing with.

It is a tall challenge for any country’s administration to go up against the United States when its domestic support base is shaky. For this reason I hope Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru will do all he can to shore up his position at home before dealing with President Trump.

(Originally written in Japanese based on an interview by Koga Kō, executive director of the Nippon Communications Foundation. Banner photo: Donald Trump takes his oath of office at the US Capitol Rotunda in Washington DC on January 20, 2025. © AFP/Jiji.)