Bracing for Round Two of “America First”: An Interview with Keiō Professor Mori Satoru

Two Faces of “America First”

TAKENAKA HARUKATA  US President-elect Donald Trump has wasted no time announcing his choices for key cabinet posts and other high-level positions. We’ve heard that he plans to nominate Marco Rubio for secretary of state and Pete Hegseth for secretary of defense. What’s your take on the foreign-policy and security team Trump has assembled so far?

MORI SATORU  I’d say that the two pillars of Trump’s foreign-policy doctrine will be unilateralism and an anti-China focus.

These approaches represent the two different strains of “America first” ideology. One is a nationalistic worldview that puts top priority on national sovereignty and takes a narrow view of the national interest, assuming that American peace and prosperity can exist independently of what’s going on in the rest of the world. The other is a power-politics approach to international affairs that insists on US leadership and targets China as the main threat to American supremacy. The members of these two tribes have been labeled as “restrainers” and “prioritizers,” respectively. In a sense, an anti-Chinese orientation is common to both camps, since the restrainers are very hostile to what they see as a Chinese campaign to deprive the US of its economic wealth. In any case, it appears that the second Trump administration’s foreign policy and security team will be headed by a mixture of people from these two groups.

The so-called restrainers are generally devoted Trump loyalists of the MAGA [Make America Great Again] camp. They’re unilateralists who believe that America will be fine as long as it builds a strong military and unleashes vigorous economic activity. The prioritizers have a more international mindset. They view the Indo-Pacific as the center of global economic growth and are determined to prevent China from achieving hegemony in the region. Both Rubio and Michael Waltz, Trump’s pick for national security adviser, may have mindsets more akin to the prioritizers. Hegseth and Tulsi Gabbard, whom Trump have named as director of national intelligence, are regarded as MAGA types.

People like Hegseth and Gabbard would probably want to root out the “deep state,” as they label the career bureaucrats in Washington. They will be out to help Trump take an axe to the entrenched bureaucracy and shake up the Washington establishment. In the past, Hegseth has written essays opposing military policies like the acceptance of LGBTQ personnel or the assignment of women to combat roles. If he really is appointed secretary of defense, he might embark on a purge of Democratic-leaning personnel in the Pentagon and the military.

There’s sure to be resistance to the appointment of such figures, but if Trump succeeds in appointing his MAGA followers to head up and overhaul these institutions, it’s going to weaken the foundations of American internationalism and accelerate the politicization of the civil service. If there’s too much of a shakeup in the Department of Defense, it could even raise concerns about military readiness. There’s bound to be some pushback from the agencies and Congress, so it’s hard to predict how things will actually play out, but there’s a real possibility that Trump’s picks could sow confusion and undermine morale within the government and the military.

Mori Satoru, professor of political science at Keiō University.

The New Protectionism

TAKENAKA  Turning to economic policy, Trump has named hedge-fund manager Scott Bessent as his choice to lead the Department of the Treasury, business executive Howard Lutnick to head the Department of Commerce, and lawyer Jamieson Greer as US trade representative. He also plans to nominate Elon Musk to head up a new Department of Government Efficiency. What’s your reaction to this lineup?

MORI  In the past, Bessent and Lutnick were characterized as moderates on the subject of tariffs, but it’s unlikely they’ll resist Trump’s flagship economic policy. It will be interesting to see whether Bessent and Lutnick can both keep in Trump’s good graces on policy matters.

A basic thrust of Trump’s economic policy is to bring back American manufacturing by slapping high tariffs on imports. Another is to bolster the defense industry. We can expect considerable emphasis on supply-chain security, which means reducing America’s economic dependence on China.

I think the fundamental aim is to rebuild US industry on a strategically independent basis insofar as that’s possible. The idea of minimizing the American economy’s dependence on foreign countries, especially China, is totally consistent with America First unilateralism, and that’s the basic reason decoupling is back on the table. The logic is very straightforward. But financially, it might not be that simple.

A Peace Deal in 24 Hours?

TAKENAKA  Trump has said repeatedly that he can end the Ukraine war in twenty-four hours. How do you expect him to deal with the conflict once he’s in office?

MORI  I’m sure he’ll go all out to mediate a truce. Generally speaking, expect the Trump administration to place more emphasis on domestic policy than diplomacy, but during his first year in office, the Ukraine war seems certain to top Trump’s foreign-policy agenda.

Trump has designated Keith Kellogg, a retired lieutenant general, as his special envoy to Ukraine and Russia. A that Kellogg co-authored for the pro-Trump America First Policy Institute proposes what it calls a pathway for ending the war. It involves getting [Russian President Vladimir] Putin to the negotiating table by promising to put Ukraine’s application for NATO membership on hold in exchange for a truce, including security guarantees for Ukraine. In addition, America and its allies would offer to ease sanctions against Russia if it honors a ceasefire and demilitarized zone. The territorial issue would likely be shelved for the time being. Return of Ukraine’s lost territory would depend on a diplomatic breakthrough sometime after Putin leaves office. But the United States and its allies would pledge not to lift all sanctions against Russia until it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine. The report also stipulates that such an agreement should include a long-term security architecture that focuses on bilateral security and defense.

This means getting the Ukrainians to agree to a truce that ignores the entire issue of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, and also to submit to a long-term security plan formulated by foreign powers. I doubt that’s something that can be accomplished in twenty-four hours.

TAKENAKA  Surely [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskyy will say no to any plan that doesn’t meet his minimum conditions for peace. What will Trump do then?

MORI  Aid to Ukraine will probably continue until negotiations stall, but the idea is to apply pressure on Ukraine by threatening to halt aid or gradually reducing it. The White House could leverage Congress for this purpose, saying that the legislature refuses to approve further aid. On the other hand, Washington could also boost aid to Ukraine temporarily if Russia refuses to come to the negotiating table.

No Place for Weak Allies

TAKENAKA  What impact do you think Trump’s election will have on America’s relationship with NATO and allies like Japan and South Korea? Will the second Trump administration double down on demands for allies to shoulder more of the costs?

MORI  The main thing is that these treaties will no longer function as guarantees of American protection. The arguments we’re hearing from Republican strategists boil down to the idea that America shouldn’t commit to defending a country—even an ally—if it can’t do so without breaking the bank. In other words, “We’ll protect strong allies, but not weak ones, which constitute a hindrance and a risk to our national interest.” And it looks like the strength of an ally is going to be gauged by the percentage of gross domestic product spent on defense. Some have speculated that the minimum may be as high as 3 percent.

The basic thinking is that America should form alliances that are advantageous to America. And where’s the advantage in an alliance with a country that America can’t defend without depleting its own power? It’s common sense, in a way.

Trump has said that Taiwan should devote as much as 10 percent of its GDP to defense. Obviously, that’s not going to be possible, but the thinking seems to be, “Taiwan is the one being threatened by China, and if Taiwan wants to deter China, it needs to invest a lot more than the 2 or 3 percent of GDP that the NATO countries spend.” In addition to considerations of deterrence, if Washington can get countries like Taiwan to buy weapons from the United States with their increased defense budgets, then that will dovetail nicely with Trump’s plans to promote growth in the domestic defense industry.

Japan in Trump’s World

TAKENAKA  Trump has said he plans to slap a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods, and tariffs ranging from 10 to 20 percent on imports from most other countries. Do you think that includes Japan?

MORI  Japan’s trade surplus with the United States in 2023 stands at 8.7 trillion yen, even higher than during the first Trump administration. So, I think it’s a pretty good bet that Japan will be a target of the new tariffs. Japanese companies that export products to the United States are going to feel the impact. Industries that export to America by way of Mexico will be hit even harder if Trump follows through on his threat of a 25 percent tax on Mexican goods.

What can Japan do about it? Well, Japan has been the top investor country in the United States [by ultimate beneficial owner] for five years running. I suppose we can appeal to Washington on the basis of this track record, while taking a tough negotiating stance and angling for exemptions.

In addition to the new tariffs, there’s speculation that Trump will insist that Japan up its defense spending and contribute more to the maintenance of US forces stationed in Japan. This is the triple whammy Japan could face if the America-first unilateralists have their way. The prioritizers, on the other hand, are interested in bolstering bilateral and minilateral alliances in order to strengthen the anti-Chinese coalition. From this perspective, Japan is a key power, and Washington will want to continue pushing for stepped-up defense cooperation. That means we’re likely to see a simultaneous increase in friction and cooperation under the second Trump administration.

What matters most for Japan is what kind of three theater defense strategy the Trump administration will pursue. Both the restrainers and the prioritizers will want to put a lid on the current conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. The goal in the Middle East will be to end the fighting with the advantage on Israel’s side and contain Iran. It’s not clear yet exactly how the administration’s Iran policy will unfold, but if Tehran is pushed too far, there’s a risk it could turn to nuclear arms which would heighten tension between Israel and Iran. Washington needs to manage the conflict in such a way as to avert the risk of a full-fledged armed conflict. Trump doesn’t want to get embroiled in Middle East conflicts, and for that reason he may rein his impulse to adopt an ultra-hardline stance toward Iran.

The basic plan for US foreign policy would appear to be putting out the fires in Europe and the Middle East and pivoting toward the Indo-Pacific so as to devote maximum attention to countering China. There’s no way to predict if that plan will succeed until we see how things develop henceforth. But it’s not going to be an easy task. It’s entirely possible that the United States will have to juggle Europe, the Middle East, and China for the next four years.

Outlook for the Japan-US Partnership

TAKENAKA  Do you think a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods is really doable?

MORI  Given Americans’ concerns about inflation, some observers believe Trump will dial that back. There are political repercussions to consider. The midterm elections are coming up in two years, and if the Republicans lose their majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives, they’ll be hard-pressed to advance their legislative agenda. At this point, it’s unclear whether Trump’s real aim is to reduce the US economy’s dependence on China, or to use the threat of tariffs to extract concessions from Beijing, or a combination of both. Given the talk of new tariffs on virtually all imports, one supposes that the underlying motive is fostering manufacturing self-sufficiency in the United States, as I mentioned earlier. But the threat of a whopping 60 percent tariff may be designed to pressure Beijing. If that’s the case, then when China announces retaliatory measures, Washington will enter into negotiations with Beijing. It might also call on China to rectify its “unfair trade practices.”

TAKENAKA  I’d like to wrap up by asking about the outlook for Japan-US ties under the second Trump administration. Despite some disagreements over tariffs and the like, do you think we can be confident that the basic relationship will remain stable overall, given the intensity of the US-China rivalry?

MORI  It remains to be seen whether and to what degree the new tariffs and demands for more defense spending will materialize. If Japan is actually confronted with these demands, it will be very challenging to respond from a bureaucratic point of view, but I think it would be ultimately politically manageable and taking measures wouldn’t be impossible. We need to stay vigilant and monitor developments closely. At this point, though, I’m cautiously optimistic about the Japan-US relationship. I think a more difficult problem for Japan might be how to respond to upheavals or contingencies elsewhere in the world, whether in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, in Ukraine, or in the Middle East. The looming question is whether we can rely on Trump’s judgment in a crisis. Given his response to the COVID-19 pandemic, there’s ample room for concern on that score.

(Originally published in Japanese based on a November 29, 2024, interview. English translation by Nippon.com. Banner photo: In the wake of his election victory, US President-elect Donald Trump celebrates with Republican members of the House of Representatives at a hotel in Washington, DC, November 13, 2024.)