FUJIWARA Kiichi
Professor at the University of Tokyo, specializing in international politics and the politics of Southeast Asia. Born in 1956. Publications include Demokurashī no teikoku: Amerika, sensō, gendai sekai (A Democratic Empire: The United States, War, and the Contemporary World), and Shinpen: Heiwa no riarizumu (Peace for Realists: Revised Edition).

INTERVIEWER: What was the focus of your keynote speech at Forum 2000?

FUJIWARA: The title of my talk was “Has the Transition to Democracy Enhanced the Rule of Law in Asia?” The word “democratization” refers to two separate phenomena: the toppling of a dictatorial regime and the formation of a democratic system. Although we use the same word to refer to both of these, they are actually quite different. Toppling a regime does not necessarily lead to a major change in the system of government. We saw this in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example. These countries achieved “democratization,” in the sense that autocratic regimes were brought to an end. But in many cases, the people who had been active in the old regime remained in positions of power even after the fall of the Communist Party, and the bureaucratic apparatus often didn’t change much at all. On some occasions, there were hardly any changes. These situations can bring disillusionment. People shrug their shoulders and wonder whether democratization is really all that it is cracked up to be.

Another thing to remember is that even after democratization and the introduction of a parliamentary democracy guaranteeing each citizen an equal vote, there is no guarantee of the government’s adherence to the rule of law. Another panel discussion at Forum 2000 was on the subject of “The Rule of Law in Russia.” The first thing one of the panelists from Russia said was: “The answer is very simple. There is no rule of law in Russia.” It’s safe to assume that the speaker was referring to the ubiquitous evidence that authoritarian rule is a fact of life again in Russia since Putin came to power.

These issues facing new democracies are quite familiar to me, since I have watched Asian countries deal with the same problems during their own shift from autocratic rule to more democratic systems in recent decades. In my talk I wanted to ask: What is the situation as far as democracy and the rule of law are concerned in Asian countries? And what can we learn from a comparison between the situation here and the way things have happened in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe? The issues that arise at the end of a period of autocratic rule, whether the system in question was a one-party Communist state or a military dictatorship, tend to be the same all over the world. Figures from the old regime maintain a grip on power within the new framework of a parliamentary democracy, the rule of law is distorted, and so on. These issues are shared right across the board.

In Asia, people used to point the finger at the presidential system in South Korea. People from the former Soviet Union or Eastern European countries will recognize the same phenomenon at work in contemporary Russia. My idea was to use my talk to introduce some of the lessons we have learned from our study of democratization as it has happened in Asian countries, and the thought processes we have gone through. I thought this might remind people in the audience that Asia is not some strange place with unique issues of its own. Rather, many of the problems that newly emerging democracies face are actually quite similar around the world, in spite of historical and cultural differences.

Panelists at the discussion on “The Rule of Law in Asia.” From left to right: Fujiwara Kiichi (Japan), Steven Gan (Malaysia), Marites Vitug (Philippines), Surendra Munshi (India), and Nippon Foundation Chairman Sasakawa Yōhei.

As a result, even people with no particular expertise on Asia listened very attentively to what I was saying and asked a lot of questions. I really felt that taking part in the forum had been a worthwhile experience.

INTERVIEWER: Do you believe it is important to avoid focusing exclusively on one’s own country or region? Do we also need to look for issues we have in common with other countries and regions?

FUJIWARA: In the context of international debate, I think it’s essential to put forward subjects of shared concern. This makes it possible to have a discussion that goes beyond any particular country or region, despite cultural differences. On this occasion, I deliberately avoided talking about Japan. In this kind of setting, once you start thinking in narrow terms—that the job of the Japanese person on the panel is to talk about Japan, for example—it becomes very difficult to build a meaningful dialogue. I think it is important to look for areas of overlapping interest or concern and discuss these from the perspective of the different backgrounds of the people involved.

The Usefulness of Non-Utilitarian Study

INTERVIEWER: One of the unique aspects of Forum 2000 is the way it provides a venue for international debate that differs from conventional government-level policy discussions. How significant is this difference?

FUJIWARA: An event of this kind is profoundly significant in many ways. One is the participation of non-practitioners like me. Because I do not have any kind of responsibility for government interests, I am able to raise important issues that aren’t easy to discuss in the course of government-level talks. The forum provides an opportunity to discuss international problems in a way that is quite different from the approach taken at government level. This is one major advantage of centering the discussion on non-government figures.

Another important aspect is the way the Forum encourages people to discuss vital issues, even if we don’t come up with any answers right away. The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton is famous for being a place where scholars can pursue projects from a much longer perspective than conventional academic study allows, without any guarantee that their studies will produce anything of immediate practical value. One of my mentors was Saitō Makoto, who spent time at the Institute. He used to describe this kind of scholarship as “the usefulness of non-utilitarian study.” I think a venue like this is absolutely vital in terms of providing a place to consider questions that may not appear particularly practical at first glance, and to attempt to grapple with difficult but essential questions. I am confident that Forum 2000 will continue to be a venue for this kind of thinking, even without Vāclav Havel here to guide us.

(Translated from an interview in Japanese. Interview and text by Kondō Hisashi, director of the Nippon Communications Foundation. Photographs by Katō Takemi. For more information on the conference, see Forum 2000 [Part I].)

Misao to Fukumaru (Misao the Big Mama and Fukumaru the Cat), a collection of photographs chronicling the ordinary daily life of an elderly woman and her beloved cat Fukumaru, might seem an unlikely bestseller. But perhaps it is precisely the tranquility of Misao’s peaceful rural life that has appealed to so many busy residents of Japan’s crowded and ultramodern cities.

The photographer responsible for capturing the bucolic lives of Ihara Misao and her feline companion is Ihara Miyoko. The identical family name is no coincidence: Miyoko is Misao’s granddaughter, and the pair live together. Miyoko, now 30 years old, wanted to photograph her grandmother to compile a permanent record of her life. Back in 2003, three years after she began her project, a stray cat happened to give birth to a white male kitten in a barn on the Ihara property. The cat was soon adopted into the family and became Misao’s inseparable companion. Suddenly, Miyoko had two lives to capture with her camera.

“Partly because they are both hard of hearing, my grandmother and Fukumaru are always looking into each other’s eyes. They’re really close,” Miyoko says. “Fukumaru is so happy and contented at my grandmother’s side. When I take a picture of the two of them together it’s like I’m photographing myself as a little girl.”

Some of the photos of 87-year-old Misao at work in the fields or relaxing with her eight-year-old cat might seem to have been taken deep in the countryside. But in fact Misao and Miyoko live on the Bōsō Peninsula in Chiba Prefecture, not far east of Tokyo.

The photos of this rural—yet not too remote—setting show Misao planting and weeding under the open sky, and enjoying a way of life that has vanished from Japan’s urban centers. Miyoko’s pictures show a slower, simpler mode of living: enjoying the subtle seasonal changes in the landscape over the course of the year, planting seeds, growing flowers and vegetables, and living off the land. And her photos also clearly convey the affection between the two companions that transcends the power of words.

“When I see the way my grandmother is living her life, I really feel that she has a kind of strength that my generation simply can’t match. She gets up with the sun, and goes to bed when it sets. She loves her cat and the vegetables in her field like her own children. If her vegetables come out well, she’s happy. She doesn’t have to worry about questions like ’what is the point of my work?’ Her way of life fills me with admiration and a sort of envy.” 

Recording Life’s Fleeting Beauty

The years spent taking photos of Misao and Fukumaru have brought home to Miyoko the preciousness of everyday life. In an instant the scene in front of her eyes passes away and becomes the past. Although each new day may seem to resemble the one that came before, every moment is unique and fleeting. Miyoko’s sense of the impermanence of life was heightened by the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11, 2011. The disaster gave her a stronger sense than ever that she needs to record the life around her for posterity. Since then, she has been taking more photos than ever.

Today, Misao and Fukumaru live happy and comfortable lives in the beautiful Japanese countryside. But who can say whether this simple way of life will last another hundred years? Miyoko continues to chronicle her grandmother’s life, in the hope that one day she will pass these precious scenes on to her own grandchildren and the rest of their generation.   

(Photographs by Ihara Miyoko; Originally written in Japanese by Komiyama Sakura, freelance writer. Produced with the cooperation of Little More Co., Ltd.)

Although Japan’s national budget for fiscal 2012 totaled ¥90.3 trillion, Japan had only ¥42.3 trillion in tax revenue. The ¥44.2 trillion shortfall was made up by issuing government bonds. On top of this, the unusual measure was taken of issuing a government compensation bond to cover the ¥2.6 trillion allocated for pension payments in the budget. Since this will have to be paid back in the future, it essentially amounts to an additional new bond issued. This marks the fourth consecutive year in which new government debt has outstripped tax revenue. On top of this, the outstanding balance of Japan’s national debt is set to exceed 219% of the nation’s total GDP in 2012, according to OECD forecasts. This level of indebtedness surpasses that of Greece and places Japan dead last among the G7 countries, well ahead of the 128% of second-place Italy.

A key factor underlying Japan’s fiscal crisis is the rising expenditure on social security such as pensions and medical and nursing care as a result of a graying population. Average life expectancy in Japan is the highest in the world, at 83, and the number of elderly people increases year after year. As of 2012, there are 2.4 people aged 20 to 64 to support every person 65 or older, but if present trends continue there will only be 1.3 people of working age for each person aged 65 or older. Japan can expect to face an extremely challenging social situation where each young person has to support one elderly person. The result of this will be a ¥1 trillion increase every year in social security expenditures.

The budget for social security programs is part of a permanent system, and is consumed by present-day generations. The fiscal principle is to cover these expenditures with permanent sources of revenue. It is highly unusual to issue government debt to fund these programs, shifting the burden to future generations. But Japan has become dependent on new bonds as a way of putting off the task of securing proper sources of budget revenue.

Japan Must Get Its Fiscal House in Order

In 2010, individual financial assets totaled ¥1,481 trillion, and 95% of all national debt was in the hands of Japanese nationals. The country also has a favorable balance of trade and a current account surplus. There is room to increase taxes—the current rate of the consumption tax is low, at just 5%. Japan is currently able to borrow cheaply, with the interest on 10-year bonds having dipped below 1% following the influx of money into Japan since the Euro crisis. These factors have led some to argue that Japan’s fiscal situation is not as dire as the statistics would suggest.

However, once housing loan obligations are deducted from the total, those household financial assets come to only ¥1,100 trillion. Meanwhile, government debt has exceeded the ¥1,000-trillion mark and continues to rise. And in 2011, as a result of factors that include the impact from the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japan’s balance of trade slipped into the red for the first time in 31 years. Its current account surplus is shrinking. Every year the country’s population gets older, and its fiscal situation is becoming worse than that of Greece. Japan has no room for complacency. Even Italy, despite its primary-balance surplus, was forced by the markets to get its finances in order. Silvio Berlusconi resigned, and the new government has pushed through a tough regime of austerity measures including an increase in the rate of the value-added tax. With the future of Japan’s social-security system in doubt, the International Monetary Fund, OECD, and credit rating agencies have warned the country that it needs to take immediate measures to improve its fiscal health.

Recognizing this need to get Japan’s fiscal house in order, Prime Minister Aso Tarō, who headed the coalition government of the Liberal Democratic Party and New Kōmeito Party from 2008 to 2009, introduced a supplementary provision of the Tax System Reform Act of FY2009. This stipulated that a debate would be held by the end of FY2011 on legal measures needed for a reform to unify the tax and social security systems.

Under Noda Yoshihiko, the present cabinet has adhered to the provisions of this law and reached an agreement on the content of the reforms. This is currently being formulated into a bill that the government plans to submit to the Diet in March.^(*1) This legislation is part of major administrative reforms that also include reducing the number of lower-house Diet seats and cutting the civil service salaries.

Public Opinion Backs Reform

Most people in Japan recognize that if the current situation continues it will be difficult to fund the nation’s social security system, and understand the need for a consumption tax hike to secure revenue toward this end.

In a public opinion survey conducted by the Nikkei Shimbun (published on February 20, 2012), the following views were expressed regarding how to maintain the social security system:

(1) 59% of those surveyed said the consumption tax should be raised; 29% thought an increase was unnecessary

(2) The proposal to increase the consumption tax to 8% by April 2014 and then to 10% by October 2015 was supported by 40% and opposed by 49%

(3) The LDP stance of refusing to cooperate with the ruling parties to raise the consumption tax, on the grounds that this would violated the promises made by the Democratic Party of Japan in its election manifesto, was found unacceptable by 61% of those surveyed, and supported by just 24%

Partly as a result of this and similar polls, many newspapers and other media outlets are calling on the government and the ruling and opposition parties to hold talks on the issue without delay in order to start reforms to unify the taxation and social security systems as soon as possible.

But there is still opposition to reform within the ruling party itself, and there has been little progress on cooperation with the opposition. But with the future of social security in peril, and Japan’s finances mired in crisis, the present generation has a duty to act to ensure that Japan avoids the fate that has befallen Greece, rather than passing the problem on to future generations.

The government needs to do more PR work to explain the issue to the public. There needs to be a serious and thorough debate in the Diet. And then the government needs to move ahead with integrated reform of the country’s tax and social security systems. This is the only way for the country to ensure the stability of social security and restore fiscal health, thereby restoring Japan’s credibility. (February 2, 2012)

(Originally written in Japanese.)

(*1) ^ The draft was submitted on March 30. As of May 2012, the debate continues.—Ed.

Branch offices (desaki kikan in Japanese) are the huge subsidiary arms of central government ministries that exist in all of Japan’s regions. Trimming these behemoths down and making them more efficient by transferring their functions to local governments is a vital issue for decentralization and administrative reform. But the draft proposal currently before the Diet imposes a number of unrealistic conditions that must be fulfilled before control of the branch offices is transferred to the regions, and all but ensures the continued existence of the vested interests of the central government.

Of roughly 300,000 government employees, around 190,000 are assigned to regional branch offices, many of them to organs such as the Tōhoku Regional Development Bureau run under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), and the regional agricultural offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. The “Hello Work” employment agencies run by the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare, are another example. It is likely that a lot of the work done by the regional branch offices could be handed over to local government; indeed, as many have pointed out, there is already a good deal of overlap between the two. In this sense, reforming the regional branch offices would kill two birds with one stone and have a dramatic effect in terms of decentralization and administrative reform. It would also be a vital step in terms of trimming the government payroll.

However, within the central government there has been stiff and vociferous opposition to these proposals. This is not surprising, since any such reforms would be akin to central government clipping its own wings. Under the Liberal Democratic Party–Kōmeitō governments of Fukuda Yasuo and Asō Tarō, a committee on decentralization suggested a target of 35,000 job cuts. Work started on reforms, but was soon put into cold storage following strong resistance from the ministries.

The Barrier to Further Reforms

The Democratic Party of Japan government was slow to address the problem after coming to power, until demands from two conglomerations of regional government demanded a change in the law as a matter of priority. The Union of Kansai Governments, centered on the Kinki area around Kobe, Kyoto, and Osaka, and the Governors’ Association of the Kyūshū Region, demanded a handover to local government of powers currently administered by three government ministries: MLIT, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and the Ministry of the Environment. For a time, the government worked toward achieving devolution in these two regions. Although he is widely believed to be noncommittal on the subject of decentralization, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko announced that he would submit a draft bill during the present session of the Diet, and preparations within the government were proceeding, centered on the Cabinet Office.

It now looks increasingly likely that the final legislation will fall substantially short of what was originally envisaged. One problem lies with the unnecessarily high hurdles the proposal puts in the way of delegating responsibility to the regions. The draft proposes that powers should be handed over to a regional union of local prefectural governments. It also requires that the areas under the authority of the government’s branch offices need to be brought together first before any progress toward decentralization can be made.

In the case of Kinki, for example, this means that reforms cannot go ahead without a Union of Kansai Governments that brings together all the prefectures under the supervision of the Kinki Regional Development Bureau. And since Nara Prefecture refuses to join the Union of Kansai Governments, it has proved impossible to fulfill the preliminary requirements necessary to go ahead with reforms. This situation allows the government to push the blame for the lack of progress back onto the regions, claiming that nothing can be done because of Nara’s refusal to get involved.

There are similar issues in Kyūshū, where there is no schedule in place for a regional union incorporating all the local prefectural governments. As a result, the prospects for decentralization are fading fast.

On top of this, an innate sense of cautiousness has led the MLIT to demand that ultimate supervisory control should remain with the ministry even after responsibility has been handed over to the regions. It is an unyielding and belligerent attitude.

The DPJ has struggled repeatedly with decentralization issues since it came to power—issues such as subsidies reforms, and revisions of the “obligations and evaluations” by which the national government imposed various standards on the regions. But changing the way the regional branch offices are run is an even more difficult challenge than any of these. This kind of reform stands little chance of success without considerable input from the prime minister’s office, but there has been little evidence of strong political leadership so far.

To make matters worse, some DPJ Diet members who have become voices for vested interests, and local municipalities compromised by their reliance on central government handouts of strings-attached subsidies, have banded together to oppose the reforms. Opposition to reform is every bit as stubborn and determined as it was when the LDP was in power. Meanwhile, the prime minister’s decision to appoint former MLIT administrative vice-minister Taketoshi Makoto as his deputy chief cabinet secretary strengthened the view of many in Kasumigaseki that the government’s efforts to reform the regional branch offices are doomed to lose momentum.

Setting aside for now the question of whether the Noda administration is fundamentally under the thumb of the bureaucrats, there is no doubt that the central ministries seem to have got the measure of the cabinet and that efforts to push through reforms have stalled.

(Originally written in Japanese on April 2, 2012.)

Greater Flexibility in Applying the Three Principles on Arms Exports

The Three Principles on Arms Exports have a long history, dating back to a statement made by Prime Minister Satō Eisaku in response to questioning in the House of Representatives in 1967. Satō set forth a policy of banning arms exports to (1) communist bloc countries, (2) countries subject to an arms export embargo under United Nations Security Council resolutions, and (3) countries involved or likely to become involved in international conflicts. This original formulation of the Three Principles was not particularly problematic. But a 1976 statement to the lower house by Prime Minister Miki Takeo declared that Japan would refrain from exports of arms even to areas other than those set forth in the Three Principles and would apply the same sort of restraint to exports of equipment used in arms manufacturing. With these additions, the government’s policy became an effective ban on all exports of arms, defense equipment, and the like.

The revision approved by the government last December was broader in scope, providing exceptions that covered not just specific cases but general categories. The newly adopted guidelines for the overseas transfer of defense equipment allow (1) the transfer of defense equipment overseas in cases involving contributions to peace and international cooperation and (2) international joint development and production of defense equipment in cases where Japan has a cooperative relationship in the field of security with the other country or countries and where joint development and production will contribute to Japan’s own security. In recent years, security has become a greater concern in the area around Japan; meanwhile Japan’s defense budget has been stagnant for a long time, and the cost of procuring the most advanced equipment, such as next generation fighter jets, has risen even higher.

The decision to finally revise the Three Principles and allow joint development and production of defense equipment with security partners other than the United States is a matter of great significance for the maintenance and enhancement of Japan’s defense industry. I hope the government will implement the revised principles as flexibly as possible.

Japan’s Development Assistance for the Mekong Region

The Fourth Mekong-Japan Summit was held in Tokyo on April 21. At this gathering Prime Minister Noda announced Japan’s intention of providing some ¥600 billion in official development assistance over the coming three years for infrastructure projects in the countries of the Mekong region, namely, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Vietnam. Assistance will be provided for 57 projects, including high-speed railway construction, involving ¥2,300 billion in total project costs.

Prior to this summit, Thailand’s Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra visited China and met with Wen Jiabao, her Chinese counterpart; the two discussed cooperation in such areas as high-speed rail construction in Thailand and the energy sector, and they agreed to aim for an increase in the value of bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2015, 50% higher than the figure for 2011. Thailand is located at the hub of the so-called Greater Mekong Subregion, and though there has been some political turbulence due to conflict between royalists and the Thaksin camp (supporters of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister, the current prime minister), the Thai government has been pursuing a consistent economic strategy aimed at building an internationally competitive mega-region centered on Bangkok. Meanwhile, in line with the master plan drawn up by the Asian Development Bank for market integration and development of “economic corridors” in the Greater Mekong Subregion, China has been building up vertical (north-south) infrastructure links with Kunming (capital of Yunnan Province) as their hub; this work includes development of the ADB’s proposed North-South Economic Corridor, high-speed rail construction, and electric power grid improvement.

Japan, meanwhile, is already implementing economic cooperation for horizontal (east-west) infrastructure in the Mekong region, including development of the proposed East-West Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor. Thailand is in a position to enjoy the benefits of economic integration in this region through cooperation with China and Japan. Prime Minister Yingluck’s visits to Beijing and Tokyo and requests for Chinese and Japanese pledges of assistance in this connection are quite natural moves from a Thai perspective.

The participants in the Tokyo summit included Myanmar’s President Thein Sein. This was the first visit to Japan by the head of state of Myanmar since 1984.In a meeting with the president, Prime Minister Noda conveyed Japan’s intention of resuming official development assistance (yen loans), which had been suspended since 1987.

Supporting the Reform Process in Myanmar

Over the past year the government of Myanmar has proclaimed its commitment to reforms in pursuit of domestic peace, economic growth, and improvement of living standards. In the legislative by-elections held on April 1 this year, the opposition National League for Democracy scored a major victory. The fact that an opposition victory was even possible is evidence that the administration of President Thein Sein has truly been implementing reforms on the political front. Also on April 1, the government confirmed its reform credentials on the economic front with an overhaul of the exchange rate system. But in the period ahead we can expect to see increased resistance to the reform process.

As noted by Kudō Toshihiro of the Institute of Developing Economies in his recently published book Myanmā seiji no jitsuzō (The Real Picture of Politics in Myanmar), Myanmar’s army greatly strengthened its power base during the years of military rule from 1988 to 2010. President Sein’s reforms are intended to leave this power base in place and legitimize a form of government in which the army will continue to be the backbone of the state. Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been calling for a revision of the constitution, which includes provisions giving the military a prominent role in politics, and the recent electoral victory by the NLD-led opposition camp is certain to fuel such demands. But General Min Aung Hlaing, Myanmar’s military commander in chief, insists that the current constitution must be kept in place.

How will this difference be settled? President Sein suggests that deliberations in the national legislature can lead to a compromise acceptable to both the army and the NLD. The outcome remains to be seen, but this issue highlights the importance of providing support for the reform process that the Sein administration is undertaking. If liberalization progresses on both the political and economic fronts, allowing inflows of foreign investment that support economic growth, it will become harder for the authorities to abandon the reforms and turn the clock back. It is good to see the decision by the Japanese government to forgo repayment of some ¥300 billion of Myanmar’s outstanding obligations from the past, and embark on a program of assistance for infrastructure building and human resources development, accompanied by the resumption of concessional ODA lending. If progress can be achieved in the quest for reconciliation with Myanmar’s ethnic minorities, and if trust can be built between the ruling and opposition camps in the legislature, and if the economy can be put on a growth track and living standards improve, the leaders of the government and army should feel more confident in their ability to maintain national stability, and we can expect to see more room for compromise on the constitution.

(Originally written in Japanese on May 2, 2012.)

Birth of Japan’s Post–Cold War Security Policy

Under the original terms of the Japan-US alliance, Japan was expected to remain lightly armed  and refrain from any overseas commitment. At the same time, it secured the military cooperation of the United States in return for the provision of US military bases on Japanese soil. The asymmetric nature of the arrangement was summed up as follows by Nishimura Kumao, who was closely involved in negotiations for the original Japan-US Security Treaty as director-general of the Treaties Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “In a word, Japan provides the facilities, while the United State provides the armed forces to defend Japan. The cooperation is between people and things.^(*2) Moreover, because Japan’s Constitution renounces the use of force, it was deemed illegal for the Self-Defense Forces to engage in overseas military operations. Consequently, any action in hostile territory was entrusted to the United States, while Japanese forces performed a strictly defensive “shield” function and nothing more.

To be sure, simply by guarding its own coastal waters and air space, Japan was playing an important role in international security during the Cold War era, particularly toward its end. The three narrow passages around the main islands of  Japan—the Sōya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima straits—were potential routes for the Soviet naval and air forces in the Asia-Pacific theater. With the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization occupied in containing the massive armies of the Eastern bloc in Europe, it was strategically vital for the Japan-US alliance to maintain a rock-solid defense in the area around the Japanese archipelago. An advisory panel on defense issues (headed by Higuchi Hirotarō) explained this role in the following way in the so-called 1994 Higuchi report, submitted to Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi in August 1994 :

The defense capability of Japan in the Cold War period was build up and maintained for the primary purpose of preparing for attacks on Japanese territory by hostile forces . . . [and] Japan’s mission was to defend the country based strictly on the right of self defense. In light of its geographical position, however, Japan naturally played an important role in the anti-Soviet strategy of the Western bloc.^(*3)

This role for Japan ended when the Cold War did. The 1990–91 conflict in the Persian Gulf was a wake-up call for the Japanese, forcing them to confront their diminished importance as a strategic shield. Tokyo responded to the crisis in the Gulf by contributing $13 billion to the multinational effort—or about 20% of the total outlay—making it the third largest contributor after Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. But the international community was decidedly underwhelmed by Japan’s generosity. The decision to send money instead of personnel to support the multinational operation was scorned as “checkbook diplomacy.” When the Kuwaiti government issued a statement through the US media in March 1991 to thank all the countries that had worked to liberate Kuwait, it did not include Japan on the list of contributing countries.

This is when Japan’s foreign-policy makers finally began to think of Japan’s defense capability as a tool for international peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, as well as national self-defense. In 1991, immediately after the Gulf War, the Japanese government sent a unit of the Marine Self-Defense Force to the Persian Gulf on a minesweeping mission. This overseas mission paved the way for the 1992 deployment of SDF troops to Cambodia to participate for the first time ever in a UN peacekeeping operation.

The new direction was articulated as follows in the 1994 Higuchi Report: “It is vital that we include among the key functions of the Self-Defense Forces that of participating as actively as possible in peacekeeping operations and other forms of multilateral cooperation carried out under the aegis of the United Nations for the purpose of international security.” This policy was subsequently incorporated in the National Defense Program Outline (later translated as “Guidelines”) adopted in late 1995. In defining the role of Japan’s defense capability, the 1995 defense guidelines specified not only “national defense” and “response to large-scale disasters and various other situations” but also “contribution to the creation of a more stable security environment” through such means as “participation in international peace cooperation activities.” ^(*4)

The North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993 and 1994, and the launch of a North Korean Nodong missile into the Sea of Japan in May 1993 gave rise to new concerns over security in the area surrounding Japan and highlighted the need to prepare for situations short of an outright attack that nonetheless posed a real threat to Japan’s security. Accordingly, as stated under the 1995 defense guidelines, “should a situation arise in the areas surrounding Japan that would have an important influence on national peace and security,” the role of Japan’s defense forces is to “take appropriate response . . . , for example, by . . .  ensuring the smooth and effective implementation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.” Although similar references to “situations in areas surrounding Japan” were to become the subject of considerable controversy in the process of deliberating the Guidelines for Japan-US Security Cooperation from 1996 to 1997, this provision in the 1995 defense guidelines largely escaped notice, perhaps owing to its inconspicuous placement under the heading “Response to large-scale disasters and various other situations.” Be that as it may, the 1995 defense guidelines expanded the role of Japan’s defense capability from the narrow Cold War focus on national defense, recognizing that the country had a role to play in security at the regional and even the global level.

At the same time, the 1995 defense guidelines placed renewed emphasis on the importance of the Japan-US alliance. Under Section I (Purpose), the guidelines stated that “Japan, . . . paying due attention to enhancing the credibility of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, will strive to ensure its own national defense and contribute to the peace and stability of the international community by appropriately upgrading, maintaining and operating its capability.” Whereas the previous National Defense Program Guidelines, adopted in 1976, referred to the Japan-US security relationship only once, the 1995 defense guidelines mentioned it 13 times. This all attests to the strong emphasis on the Japan-US alliance in the new defense guidelines. ^(*5)

Birth of the US Post–Cold War Security Policy

The US government gave the first clear indication of its post–Cold War security strategy not long after US President Bill Clinton took office in 1993. This new strategy was outlined in the Report on the Bottom-Up Review released by the Department of Defense in September 1993.^(*6) Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, a former chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, had called for a “bottom-up review” of the nation’s defense program in response to calls for sharp cuts in defense spending to realize the “peace dividend” anticipated in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. The report called for a reduction in military personnel from 2.17 million (as of 1987) to 1.4 million by 1999 (actual personnel strength after the reductions was 1.45 million). Taking into account instability in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula, Aspin recommended this number as the level needed for the United States to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously.

The Nye Initiative and the Joint Security Declaration

Recognition of the importance of the Japan-US alliance came from Washington in the form of the 1995 Nye Report and from Tokyo in the form of the 1995 National Defense Program Guidelines. It remained for the two allies to reaffirm this mutual understanding at the top level of government and to translate it into closer collaboration at the operational level. They did so by means of the 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation.

Efforts to reach an agreement on a redefinition of Japan-US alliance actually date back to 1994, when a Japanese government panel was holding discussions to compile the Higuchi Report, with an eye to establishing directions for the 1995 defense outline. The report, issued in August 1994, proposed four basic thrusts for Japanese defense policy going forward: (1) development of Japan’s defense capability for the purpose of multilateral security cooperation, including active participation in UN peacekeeping operations; (2) stronger bilateral security cooperation with the United States; (3) maintenance and qualitative improvement of Japan’s self-defense capability; and (4) development of the domestic defense industry and technological infrastructure. This organizational structure—beginning with the broader international context, then moving on to the Japan-US alliance before concluding with a discussion of Japan’s independent self-defense capability—was perfectly logical to defense policy makers at the time. Moreover, at a moment when Japan—chastened by the experience of the Gulf War—was finally beginning to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, it made sense to begin by setting forth the concept of multilateral security.

However, this organization alarmed some East Asia experts in the United States, including former Harvard professor Joseph Nye, Harvard professor Ezra Vogel, up and coming Japan scholar Michael Green of Johns Hopkins University, and Patrick Cronin of the Institute for National Strategic Studies. To their way of thinking, the decision to place the section on multilateral security cooperation ahead of the section on Japan-US cooperation signaled a shift toward multilateralism at the expense of the bilateral alliance.^(*9)  In a paper titled “Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Green and Cronin warned that “momentum and energy in Japanese policy planning are flowing away from the alliance” and called for a comprehensive dialogue to establish the roles that Japan and the United States would play in the bilateral alliance in the coming years.^(*10)  In September 1994, Joseph Nye—newly appointed assistant secretary of state, after a stint as chairman of the National Intelligence Council—began making arrangements for a bilateral security policy review that became known as the Nye Initiative. The goal was to reach a basic agreement in about a year’s time and release it at a summit meeting in the form of a joint statement by the two nations’ leaders. The talks proceeded on schedule, and the statement was set to be released in November 1995 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference in Osaka, but domestic circumstances prevented Clinton from traveling to Japan at that time, and the statement had to be postponed until the following year. Meanwhile, however, Washington had already reaffirmed its commitment to the Japan-US alliance in the Nye Report, issued in February 1995, while Japan spelled out its ongoing emphasis on the bilateral security relationship in its 1995 defense guidelines, released that November.

During the same period, simmering discontent over US military bases in Okinawa—where (by acreage) 75% of American military facilities in Japan were concentrated—boiled over in reaction to the September 1995 rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three US servicemen. In response, the Japanese and US governments set up the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, or SACO, to formulate measures for realigning the US military forces in Japan and alleviating the burden on Okinawa. One such measure was the April 1996 agreement to relocate US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from its urban site in Ginowan, just outside of Naha.^(*11)

The Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security was finally issued at a summit conference between Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō and President Clinton on April 17, 1996.^(*12)  The significance of this statement was threefold. First, as an official statement on the post–Cold War redefinition of the Japan-US alliance, it notified both nations and the rest of the world that the leaders of Japan and the United States regarded their bilateral partnership as vital to security in the new era. Second, it went beyond the traditional focuses of Japan-US cooperation—the defense of Japan and bilateral sharing of defense technology—to include security cooperation at the regional and global levels. During the Cold War, discussions of the Japan-US security relationship had rarely ranged beyond narrow bilateral issues, such as the US commitment to defend Japan in the event of an attack and Japanese cooperation with US forces stationed in Japan. The joint statement took a broader view of the Japan-US security partnership by including cooperation on such regional challenges as stabilization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as such global efforts as international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Third, the joint statement called for a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, a key step for strengthening cooperation between the US military and the SDF at the operational level.^(*13) 

US President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto shake hands after signing the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security on April 17, 1996. (Photo: Sankei Shimbun)

The New Guidelines for Defense Cooperation

The original Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation were approved in 1978 by the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (SCC; also known as the “two-plus-two”) as a result of talks initiated under the leadership of Defense Agency Director General Michita Sakata and US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. The document spelled out the division of responsibilities and forms of cooperation between the SDF and the US military under the bilateral security arrangements with the aim of ensuring smooth and effective collaboration. It played an important role in strengthening the cooperative arrangements at the operational level during the 1970s and 1980s. However, because these guidelines were designed to deal with the strategic environment of the Cold War, they clearly needed to be adapted to the dramatically altered environment of the post–Cold War era. New guidelines were developed through extensive consultations (including four rounds of scenario studies), and submitted to the SCC on September 23, 1997.^(*14) The 1997 guidelines provided for three basic categories of security cooperation: (1) “cooperation under normal circumstances,” (2) “actions in response to an armed attack against Japan,” and (3) “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”

As the Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security had placed special emphasis on the need for policy coordination in regard to situations in areas surrounding Japan, this category of cooperation naturally emerged as the focus of consultations on the new guidelines. While the 1978 guidelines had included a section on cooperation in the case of “situations in the Far East outside of Japan,” it was vague and tentative, and only one-tenth as long as the section on cooperation in the case of an armed attack on Japan. In the 1997 guidelines, by contrast, the section on situations in areas surrounding in Japan was longer than the section pertaining to an armed attack on Japan.

The new guidelines provide some 40 examples of cooperation in situations in areas surrounding in Japan, distributed among three subcategories. The first subcategory, “Cooperation in activities initiated by either government,” refers to activities whose effectiveness is enhanced by bilateral cooperation, although either country can engage in them or not, at its own discretion. Examples of this include “search and rescue” and “noncombatant evacuation” operations. The second category, “Japan’s support for U.S. forces activities,” comprises provision of facilities for US use and such rear area support as supply, transport, and maintenance, as required by the American side. The third category, “US-Japan operational cooperation,” includes sharing of information from surveillance or intelligence gathering and measures to ensure navigational safety in Japanese territorial waters and air space.^(*15)

Japan needed to pass new legislation to enable the SDF to participate in some of the activities indicated in the 1997 guidelines, especially those relating to situations in areas surrounding Japan. In April 1998, the government submitted a set of bills to the Diet, and by November 2000 the legislature had enacted the entire package, establishing a legal basis for cooperation with the US military in areas surrounding Japan, including rear area support, search and rescue operations, and ship inspections.^(*16)

The 1997 guidelines also note that an attack on Japan and a situation in areas surrounding Japan could take place concurrently—if, for example, Japan was the target of a missile or commando attack during an armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It was clear that Japan had much to do in terms of fortifying its defense capability in order to be able to cooperate with the United States in surrounding areas while its own security was directly under threat. In the next few years, Japan made rapid progress in this regard. In the late 1990s, it stepped up cooperation with the United States on ballistic missile defense, and in December 2003 it adopted plans for a two-tiered BMD system consisting of Aegis ship-based missile defense system and surface-to-air Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) interceptor missiles. In 2003 the government also succeeded—after 30 years—in passing several key pieces of legislation enhancing the SDF’s ability to respond to emergencies.

The Significance of Redefinition for Japan

Even before the process of redefining the Japan-US alliance began, Japan had made the decision to use its own defense capability for global security through participation in UN peacekeeping operations and other international peace efforts. The 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security clearly articulated Japan’s commitment to strengthening Japan-US cooperation in such global operations, and also in matters of regional security in Northeast Asia (i.e., “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan”). In deliberating the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, the Japanese were obliged to look more closely into modes of regional cooperation, while at the same time exploring measures to protect Japan itself from new security threats, including ballistic missile and commando attacks. In short, deliberations associated with these key agreements embraced the entire range of security issues facing Japan—from homeland defense to regional concerns and matters of global security.

For Japan, in short, the redefinition of the Japan-US alliance involved not only adapting the alliance to the post–Cold War environment but also formulating a complete national security strategy for the new era. It was, in fact, the first time in two decades—since the formulation of the 1976 defense guidelines and the 1978 guidelines—that Japan had undertaken a complete review of its own defense policy and embarked on comprehensive policy coordination with the United States.

Since then, Japan has twice revised its National Defense Program Guidelines—in 2004 and 2010.^(*17) In bilateral consultations held from 2004 to 2006, Japanese and US officials engaged in exhaustive discussion of the two nations’ mutual objectives, roles, and responsibilities in order to hammer out workable solutions for the realignment of US military forces in Japan, including the facilities to replace those at Futenma. At the “two-plus-two” Security Consultative Committee meeting in June 2011, top US and Japanese foreign policy and defense officials agreed on a new set of shared strategic goals and identified areas in which stronger cooperation is required to reach those goals^(*18) on the basis of the new Defense Program Guidelines^(*19) and the Quadrennial Defense Review adopted the previous year by Japan and the United States, respectively.^(*20)

Viewed in this context, the redefinition of the Japan-US alliance can be seen as a template for ongoing bilateral coordination as both sides continue to adapt their security policies to the changing demands of the twenty-first century. With the collapse of the tense yet relatively constant Cold War configuration, the world has entered a period of uncertainty and fluidity that is likely to continue for the first few decades of the new century. Under these circumstances, we can expect the process of adaptation and coordination arising from the redefinition of the bilateral alliance to continue for some time to come.

(*1) ^  For previous analyses of this process, see Shibata Teruyoshi, Reisengo Nihon no bōei seisaku (Japan’s Post–Cold War Defense Policy) (Hokkaidō University Press, 2011); Sotooka Hidetoshi, Honda Masaru, and Miura Toshiaki, Nichi-Bei dōmei hanseiki: Anpo to mitsuyaku (The Japan-US Alliance over a Half-Century: The Security Treaty and Secret Agreements) (Asahi Shimbun Company, 2001), pp. 486–540; Yamaguchi Noboru, “Japanese Adjustments to the Security Alliance with the United States,” in Michael Armacost and Daniel Okimoto (eds.), The Future of America’s Alliances in Northeast Asia (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp.73–90.

(*2) ^ Nishimura Kumao, Anzen hoshō jōyaku ron (Discourse on the Security Treaty) (Jiji Press, 1960), p.40.

(*3) ^ Cabinet Secretariat, Nihon no anzen hoshō to bōeiryoku no arikata: 21 seiki e mukete no tenbō (The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century) (Bureau of Ministry of Finance Printing 1994). The panel was established in February 1994 by the anti-LDP coalition government headed by Hosokawa Morihiro in preparation for the revision of the 1976 National Defense Program Outlook. The panel continued its work after Hosokawa’s resignation in April and that of his successor, Hata Tsutomu, the following June; and on August 12 submitted the co-called Higuchi Report to Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, who headed a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party of Japan. 

(*4) ^ Japan Defense Agency, National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 1996, December 1995.

(*5) ^ Japan Defense Agency, National Defense Program Guidelines in and after FY 1977, October 1976.

(*6) ^ Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, US Department of Defense, October 1993.

(*7) ^ Around this time, the US Pacific Command began issuing an annual report called the Asia Pacific Economic Update, stressing the economic importance of the region to the United States.

(*8) ^ U.S. Department of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, February 1995.

(*9) ^ Shibata, Reisengo Nihon no bōei seisaku, pp.109–118.

(*10) ^ Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, “Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo’s National Defense Program,” McNair Paper 31, (National Defense University, November 1994)

(*11) ^ Special Action Committee on Okinawa, The SACO Final Report, December 2, 1996; The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an integral part of the SACO Final Report), December 2, 1996.

(*12) ^ Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration On Security—Alliance for the 21st Century, April 17, 1996.

(*13) ^ Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, November 27, 1978.

(*14) ^ Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee on Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, September 23, 1997.

(*15) ^ Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, September 23, 1997.

(*16) ^ Most notably, the Act on Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Perilous Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan and the Act on Ship Inspection Operations in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.

(*17) ^ National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005– (Japanese version), December 2004; National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond, December 2010.

(*18) ^ Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (2+2), June 2011.

(*19) ^ Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and beyond, December 2010.

(*20) ^ US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.

Sharp’s incoming president, Okuda Takashi, takes questions at a press conference to announce the capital and business alliance with Taiwan’s Hon Hai Precision Industries, a global leader in electronics manufacturing services. (Photo: Jiji Press)

Sharp has entered into a capital and business alliance with Taiwan’s Hon Hai Precision Industries (which trades as Foxconn), the world’s largest electronics manufacturing services group. The significance is clear: the vertically integrated model, in which a single company deals with everything from planning new products to designing and manufacturing the component parts and selling the finished product, is disappearing from the Japanese electronics industry.

Collaborating with emerging forces in Asia and elsewhere and moving to a model of horizontal specialization was unavoidable if Japanese companies were to compete with Samsung, Apple, and the rest. Now Japan needs to grapple with the problem of how to come up with ideas for attractive new products and services. If it fails to do this, Japan risks ending up as little more than a manufacturer of parts.

Digitalization and the Horizontal Specialization Model

The root cause of the enormous losses reported by Sharp, Panasonic, and others is their insistence on being self-sufficient. These companies have invested enormous amounts of capital to manufacture the panels that are the main components of large television sets themselves. So long as the finished product sells in sufficient numbers around the world, manufacturing the panels in your own factories means efficiencies of scale and higher profits. But a company takes a big risk with this strategy. If the volume sold fails to exceed the break-even point, the company immediately takes an enormous loss.

What about the other half of the alliance? Hon Hai Precision Industries produces a large number of products for Apple. To do this, they need to secure large numbers of high-quality glass panels and other components. With Apple rumored to be entering the television market in the near future, the company’s need for high-quality panels is only increasing. For Hon Hai, linking up with a Japanese manufacturer fulfills a long-held ambition. For Sharp, providing these services to Hon Hai will improve falling utilization rates at the cutting-edge plant that produces the panels at Sakai, near Osaka, and provide a welcome boost to profits. The interests of both parties are well aligned.

In a sense, moving away from vertical integration toward horizontal specialization marks an inevitable adjustment to the digital age. Compared to machine components, consistent quality parts for digital products can be readily manufactured more or less anywhere. Assembling the final product is also comparatively straightforward. It was these factors that led to the development of the horizontal specialization model of building electrical appliances, in which cheap parts made in Taiwan, China, and Southeast Asia are put together with Japan-made components at factories in Asia. Apple is one company that has made skillful use of this model to grow to where it is today.

For too long, Japanese companies have stuck to their self-sufficiency model and failed to keep up with the tide of change. For a colossal business like Samsung, it may be possible to enjoy the fruits of a self-sufficient, vertically integrated business model for some time to come. But for Japanese companies, with their rapidly dwindling share of the global market, this was already an impossible proposition.

Wanted: An Ability to Create New Concepts

Casting off the self-sufficiency mindset will mean putting a new challenge in front of Japanese manufacturers. They need to improve their ability to develop new concepts—something that is often pointed to as a weakness for the Japanese and Japanese businesses. Once a clearly defined concept is in place, Japanese companies are second to none at working toward the concept and building the product. Unfortunately, however, many Japanese companies are less adept when it comes to using strategic thinking to ascertain what the markets want, what products they need to make, and what kind of companies they should be looking to ally themselves with.

Japan’s companies need to develop the strengths that will enable them to perform as core players in the horizontal specialization model: coming up with new concepts for products and services, assembling parts, and maximizing sales opportunities in order to compete in the global marketplace. If they don’t, they will become mere cogs in the machinery of other global corporations.